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I. IntroductIon
The District of Columbia (D.C.) marked a landmark civil rights 
achievement in December 2009 when the city passed the Religious 
Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act.1 The law’s 
enactment allowed D.C. to become the sixth jurisdiction to sanction 
same-sex marriage in the United States.2 Supporters hailed the law as a 
* J.D. Candidate, American University Washington College of Law, 2011; B.A., The College of 
William & Mary, 2007. Current Editor-In-Chief of The Modern American.  Former community 
organizer with Virginia Organizing and Board of Director at Equality Virginia.  I would like to 
thank Jamie Abrams for her feedback and support on this article.
1 A18-0248, enacted as L18-0110, Dec. 18, 2009. See D.C. City Council, “Religious Freedom and 
Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009,” http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/
lims/legislation.aspx?LegNo=B18-0482&Description=RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-AND-CIVIL-
MARRIAGE-EQUALITY-AMENDMENT-ACT-OF-2009.&ID=23204. 
2 Ian Urbina, D.C. Council Approves Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 2009 available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/us/16marriage .html.
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victory	for	lesbian	and	gay	equality,	while	detractors	vowed	that	their	
efforts	to	traditionally	define	marriage	would	continue.3
Among	 the	 most	 public	 opponents	 of	 the	 law	 was	 the	 Catholic	
Archdiocese	of	Washington,	which	operates	Catholic	Charities,	a	lead-
ing	service	provider	to	low-income	residents	in	the	metropolitan	area.4	
The	Catholic	Archdiocese	warned	the	D.C.	City	Council	that	it	would	
sever	 its	 professional	 relationship	 with	 the	 city	 if	 the	 same-sex	 mar-
riage	 law	 passed	 because	 same-sex	 unions	 are	 inconsistent	 with	 the	
Church’s	 core	 theological	 teachings.5	 Once	 the	 law	 went	 into	 effect,	
over	a	year	later,	the	D.C.	City	Council	cancelled	the	foster	and	adop-
tion	 program	 that	 the	 city’s	 Child	 and	 Family	 Services	 Agency	 and	
the	Catholic	Archdiocese	co-administered	for	eighty	years,	citing	that	
the	religious	organization	was	no	longer	eligible	to	provide	services.6	
Weeks	later,	the	Catholic	Archdiocese	announced	that	it	would	no	lon-
ger	 offer	 spousal	 benefits	 to	 its	 new	 employees.7	 The	 political	 battle	
between	the	D.C.	City	Council	and	the	Catholic	Archdiocese	remains	
heated,	as	the	law’s	full	fall-out	is	yet	to	be	realized.	However,	there	are	
two	observations	from	this	conflict	that	should	inform	lawmakers	and	
policy	advocates	alike.
The	 first	 observation	 is	 that	 Catholic	 Charities’s	 choice	 to	 cut	 its	
employee	benefits	demonstrates	 the	 lengths	 to	which	some	religious	
organizations	will	go	to	deny	lesbian	and	gay	equality.8	D.C.’s	same-
sex	marriage	law	itself	did	not	require	that	Catholic	Charities	discon-
tinue	its	employee	spousal	benefits.	Rather,	the	Catholic	Archdiocese	
chose	to	eliminate	spousal	benefits	for	all of	its	employees	to	comply	
3	 Id.
4	 See Catholic	Charities,	“History	and	Mission,”	available at http://www.catholiccharitiesdc.org/
about/history_mission/	(stating	that	Catholic	Charities	is	the	largest	private	service	provider	in	
the	D.C.	area).
5	 William	 Wan,	 Same-sex marriage leads Catholic Charities to adjust benefits,	 Wash. Post,	 Mar.	 2,	
2010	 available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/01/
AR2010030103345.html	 (discussing	Catholic	Charities’	decision	 to	 termination	spousal	benefits	
for	new	employees).	
6	 See	 Catholic	 News	Agency,	 Same-sex ‘marriage’ law forces D.C. Catholic Charities to close adop-
tion program,	Catholic News Agency,	Feb.	17,	2010	available at http://www.catholicnewsagency.
com/news/same-sex_marriagelaw_forces_d.c._catholic_charities_to_close_adoption_program	
(discussing	Catholic	Charities’	decision	to	shut	down	its	foster	care	program).	A	similar	kind	of	
conflict	led	to	Catholic	Charities	of	Boston	to	close	its	adoption	program.	See generally,	Theresa	
Rutledge,	Caught in the Crossfire: How Catholic Charities of Boston Was Victim to the Clash Between 
Gay Rights and Religious Freedom,	15	Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y	297	(2008)	(explaining	the	conflict	
between	religious	liberty	and	gay	rights	as	shown	through	the	Catholic	Charities	of	Boston	adop-
tion	program	closure	after	the	state	of	Massachusetts	passed	its	gay	marriage	law	based	on	the	
organization’s	opposition	to	same-sex	adoption).
7	 Id.
8	 This	statement	does	not	suggest	that	every	Catholic	Archdiocese	would	take	similar	action,	but	
it	is	meant	to	illustrate	an	extreme	example.	
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with	the	Equal	Pay	Act9	and	Title	VII	of	the	Civil	Rights	Act	of	1964,10	
which	both	were	 triggered	by	the	same-sex	marriage	 law.	The	Equal	
Pay	Act	requires	equal	compensation	for	substantially	similar	work,11	
and	Title	VII	bans	employer	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	sex,12	both	of	
which	mandate	equal	compensation	for	employees	performing	similar	
work,	including	fringe	benefits.13	Catholic	Charities,	therefore,	would	
have	been	exposed	to	legal	liability	if	the	organization	did	not	extend	
equal	employee	benefits	to	those	with	same-sex	spouses.	The	Catholic	
Archdiocese	ultimately	elected	 to	cut	spousal	benefits	 for	every	new	
employee	rather	than	to	offer	the	same	benefits	to	their	new	lesbian	or	
gay	employees.	In	other	words,	Catholic	Charities’	administrative	deci-
sion	hurt	all	of	its	new	workers	—	gay	and	straight	alike.
The	 second	 observation	 is	 that	 the	 D.C.	 City	 Council	 elected	 to	
carve	out	a	narrow	religious	activity	exemption	 in	 its	same-sex	mar-
riage	law,	which	states:
Notwithstanding	 any	 other	 provision	 of	 law,	 a	 reli-
gious	society,	or	nonprofit	organization	that	is	operated,	
supervised,	 or	 controlled	 by	 or	 in	 conjunction	 with	 a	
religious	 society,	 shall	 not	 be	 required	 to	 provide	 ser-
vices,	accommodations,	facilities,	or	goods	for a purpose 
related to the solemnization or celebration of a marriage, or 
the promotion of a marriage	 through	religious	programs,	
counseling,	courses,	or	retreats,	that	is	in	violation	of	the	
religious	society’s	beliefs	(emphasis	added).14
The	Act’s	 religious	 organization	 exemption,	 related	 only	 to	 mar-
riage	activities,	strikes	a	reasonable	balance	between	religious	freedom	
and	 civil	 rights.	 On	 one	 hand,	 the	 exemption	 states	 that	 a	 religious	
organization	may	refuse	to	sanction	same-sex	unions,	but,	on	the	other	
hand,	 the	exemption	also	 implicitly	recognizes	that	civil	society	may	
9	 29	 U.S.C.	 §	 206(d)	 (1963)	 available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/	 statutes/epa.cfm	 (“The	
Equal	Pay	Act	is	more	limited	in	scope	because	it	only	covers	employers	‘engaged	in	commerce	
or	the	production	of	goods	for	commerce’;	therefore,	it	is	possible,	though	unlikely,	that	the	Equal	
Pay	Act	would	apply	to	Catholic	Charities.	.	.	.”).
10	 42	U.S.C.	§	2000e	et	seq.,	as	amended,	available at http://www.eeoc.gov	/laws/statutes/titlevii.
cfm	(establishing	equal	employment	opportunities).	
11	 See supra	note	9.	
12	 See supra	note	10.		
13	 See	 U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n,	 Compensation Discrimination Compliance 
Manual	under	“Definitions	of	‘Wages’	and	‘Wage	Rate,’	available at http://www.eeoc.gov/poli-
cy/docs/compensation	.html#N_40	(“The	term	‘wages’	encompasses	all	forms	of	compensation,	
including	fringe	benefits.”).
14	 D.C. Code	46-401(e)(1)	(2009)	available at http://www.dcregs.dc.gov/	Gateway/NoticeHome.
aspx?noticeid=114380	 (clarifying	 that	 “Marriage	 between	 2	 people	 in	 the	 District	 of	 Columbia	
shall	not	be	denied	or	limited	on	the	basis	of	gender.”).	See also	D.C. Code	46-401(d)	(“Each	re-
ligious	society	has	exclusive	control	over	its	own	theological	doctrine,	teachings,	and	beliefs	re-
garding	who	may	marry	within	that	particular	religious	society’s	faith.”).	
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exercise	its	institutional	prerogative	to	confer	benefits	to	whomever	it	
chooses.	Religious	freedom	and	civil	rights,	in	this	way,	can	harmonize	
to	accommodate	a	plurality	of	beliefs	and	interests.
The	D.C.	law	is	an	exception,	however,	as	many	lesbian,	gay,	bisex-
ual,	 and	 transgender	 civil	 rights	 laws	 fail	 to	 strike	 a	 reasonable	 bal-
ance	between	religious	freedom	and	robust	discrimination	protection.15	
Most	 notably,	 the	 Employment	 Non-Discrimination	 Act	 (ENDA),16	
designed	 to	 extend	 federal	 employment	 discrimination	 protection	 to	
gay,	 lesbian,	 bisexual,	 and	 transgender	 (LGBT)	 people,17	 contained	 a	
religious	organization	exemption	much	broader	than	the	existing	Title	
VII	exemption.	ENDA’s	religious	exemption,	taking	different	iterations	
over	 fifteen	 years,	 begs	 an	 important	 question:	 why	 were	 religious	
organizations	permitted	to	discriminate	against	LGBT	people	but	not	
against	other	statutorily	protected	groups?18
This	 comment	 discusses	 ENDA’s	 long	 history	 of	 broad	 religious	
exemption	and	its	meanings	for	LGBT	civil	rights	progress	ahead.	Part	
I	traces	ENDA’s	religious	exemption	transformation	from	1994	to	pres-
ent,	noting	a	narrowing	of	the	exemption	as	the	LGBT	movement	wit-
nessed	increasing	political	success.	Part	II	examines	the	delicate	balance	
between	the	First	Amendment	Religion	Clauses,	as	well	as	LGBT	civil	
	rights	and	religious	freedom,	and	argues	that	ENDA’s	previous	exemp-
tions	 tipped	 this	delicate	balance	 toward	religious	over-accommoda-
tion	prohibited	by	the	Establishment	Clause.	Part	III	concludes	that	the	
LGBT	movement	experienced	a	significant	victory	with	the	modified	
religious	exemption	 in	 the	2009	version	of	ENDA,	which	challenged	
the	conservative	Christian	bloc’s	political	and	cultural	monopoly	over	
LGBT	rights’	narrative,	and	represents	the	defeat	of	a	potentially	dan-
gerous	precedent	for	future	civil	rights	struggles.
15	 Many	state	and	local	LGBT	civil	rights	statutes	wholly	exempt	religious	organizations.	See e.g.,	
Conn. Gen. Stat.	§	46a-81p	(West	2009);	Mass. Gen. Laws	Ann.	ch.	151B,	§	4	(West	2009).
16	 ENDA	 was	 originally	 introduced	 in	 1994.	 See S.	 2238,	 103d	 Cong.	 (1994)	 available at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=	 103_cong_bills&docid=f:s2238is.txt.pdf.	
Iterations	of	the	bill	have	been	introduced	in	almost	every	subsequent	year	to	date.	
17	 It	was	not	until	 the	most	recent	ENDA	version,	 the	2009	bill,	 that	 the	 law	included	“gender	
identity”	and	“gender	expression”	which	protects	transgender	and	gender	non-conforming	peo-
ple.	See	Nat’l	Center	for	Lesbian	Rights,	Employment	Non-Discrimination	Act,	available at http://
www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=issue_federallegislation_enda	 (describing	 the	
provisions	and	background	of	ENDA).	
18	 There	 is	 one	 statutorily	 protected	 status	 that	 is	 not	 protected	 against	 religious	 organization	
discrimination:	religion.	This	exception	will	be	discussed	in	further	detail	later	in	Part	I.	
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II. The evoluTIon of enDA’s RelIgIous  
oRgAnIzATIon exempTIon
ENDA	has	been	introduced	in	almost	every	Congress	from	1994	to	
2009.19	Its	amendment	to	its	religious	exemption	in	2009	is	consistent	
with	 the	 bill’s	 numerous	 religious	 exemption	 iterations	 since	 1994.20	
ENDA’s	religious	exemption	began	as	an	extremely	broad	measure,	but	
it	has	steadily	narrowed	since.21	These	changes	reflect	the	bill’s	political	
viability	for	passage	from	session-to-session,	in	which	the	bill’s	spon-
sors	 conceded	 broader	 exemptions	 as	 a	 bargaining	 tool,	 despite	 its	
ill-fated	chances	for	passage.22	As	ENDA’s	likelihood	for	passage	was	
greater	during	 the	111th	Congress	 than	any	other	 time,	 the	 religious	
organization	exemption	is	both	a	crucial	provision,	and	indicator	about	
the	political	climate	on	gay	rights,	more	generally.
A. enDA’s evoluTIon fRom 1994 To 2007
The	 1994	 version	 of	 ENDA	 contained	 a	 very	 broad	 religious	
exemption,	 providing	 that	 the	 Act	 “shall	 not	 apply	 to	 religious	
organizations.”23	It	did,	however,	provide	a	for-profit	exception	whose	
application	reached	“for-profit	activities	subject	to	taxation	under	sec-
tion	 511(a)	 of	 the	 Internal	 Revenue	 Code	 of	 1986.”24	 This	 exception	
was	 comparatively	 insignificant	 because	 many	 religiously-affiliated,	
secular	organizations	are	not-for-profit	organizations.25	ENDA’s	initial	
19	 	 See	 S.	 2238,	 103d	 Cong.	 §7(a)	 (1994)	 available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=103_cong_	 bills&docid=f:s2238is.txt.pdf;	 H.R.	 1863,	 104th	 Cong.	 §6	 (1995)	
available at thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c104:1:./temp/~mdbszcMrs3;	 S.869,	 105th	 Cong.	
§	 9	 (1997)	 available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_cong_
bills&docid=f:s869is.txt.pdf;	S.	 1276,	106th	Cong.	§9	 (1999)	available at http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_bills&docid=f:s1276is.txt.pdf	 ;	 S.	 1284,	 107th	
Cong.	 §9	 (2001)	 available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_
cong_bills&docid=f:s1284is.txt.pdf;	 S.1705,	 108th	 Cong.	 §9	 (2003)	 available at http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_bills&docid=f:s1705is.txt.pdf;	 H.R.	
3685,	 110th	 Cong.	 §	 6	 (2007),	 available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h3685pcs.txt.pdf.	
20	 See id.	
21	 Compare, e.g.,	 S.	 2238,	 103d	 Cong.	 §7(a)	 (1994)	 available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=103_cong_	bills&docid=f:s2238is.txt.pdf	with	H.R.	3685,	110th	Cong.	
§	 6	 (2007),	 available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_	
bills&docid=f:h3685pcs.txt.pdf.	
22	 See	Matt	Baume,	Pressure mounts to pass ENDA,	Bay Area Reporter,	May	20,	2010	available at 
http://www.ebar.com/news/article.php?	sec=news&article=4795	(“It’s	been	16	years	since	the	
Employment	Non-Discrimination	Act	was	first	introduced	in	Congress,	and	according	to	organiz-
ers	of	a	Tuesday	rally	at	Speaker	Nancy	Pelosi’s	San	Francisco	office,	it’s	closer	than	ever	to	being	
finally	passed.”).	
23	 	S.	2238,	103d	Cong.	§7(a)	(1994)	available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=103_cong_	bills&docid=f:s2238is.txt.pdf.	
24	 Id.	at	§7(b).
25	 See Andrew	C.	Nichols,	Exemptions for “Religious Corporations” from Employment Discrimination 
Statutes: Should Non-Profit Status Be Required?,	 3	 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y	 133,	 137	 (2005)	 (noting	
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broad	 exemption	 is	 not	 surprising	 considering	 that	 lawmakers	 were	
unlikely	 to	 jeopardize	 the	 legislation	amidst	a	Republican-controlled	
Congress	at	the	height	of	the	“Republican	Revolution.”26
During	 the	 bill’s	 subsequent	 re-introduction	 from	 19942001,	 the	
legislation’s	 exemption	 did	 not	 change	 at	 all	 until	 2001.	 The	 1995	
and	 1996	 Senate	 bills	 retained	 the	 1994	 language.27	 The	 legislation’s	
first	 House	 hearings	 in	 the	 Government	 Programs	 Subcommittee	 of	
the	 Committee	 on	 Small	 Business	 took	 place	 in	 1996.28	 Georgetown	
University	Law	Center	Associate	Professor	Chai	R.	Feldblum,	testify-
ing	in	support	of	the	bill,	acknowledged	that	the	bill	contained	a	“broad	
religious	exemption.”	She	explained	the	exemption	scope	was	“signifi-
cantly	broader	 than	 the	 scope	 in	Title	VII”	because	“ENDA	exempts	
religious	organizations	completely”	except	for	profit-making	activities,	
which	was	a	sharp	contrast	to	similar	exemptions,	including	Title	VII,	
which	 remained	 “subject	 to	 the	 other	 requirements	 of	 Title	 VII	 with	
regard	to	such	bases	as	race	or	gender	(consistent	with	constitutional	
limitations).”29	 In	 1997,	 lawmakers	 tweaked	 part	 B	 of	 the	 exemption	
related	to	the	not-for-profit	exception;	however,	the	exception	remained	
ostensibly	the	same.30
Years	of	ENDA	rejection	finally	led	to	a	small	victory	when	President	
Bill	Clinton	issued	Executive	Order	13087,	which	extended	employment	
protections	to	federal	employees.31	The	revised	order	added	“sexual	ori-
entation”	to	Executive	Order	11478,	“Equal	Employment	Opportunity	
in	the	Federal	Government,”	which	protected	federal	employees	from	
that	no	court	has	held	that	Title	VII’s	religious	exemption	codified	in	702	applies	to	a	for-profit	
corporation).
26	 See, e.g.,	 Robert	 Woodberry	 &	 Christian	 Smith,	 Fundamentalism et al: Conservative Protestants 
in America,	24	Annual Review of Sociology,	25,	44	 (1998)	 (describing	the	conservative,	evan-
gelical,	Moral	Majority	movement’s	evolution	into	the	Republican	Revolution	of	the	1990s	which	
maintained	opposition	to	social	valued-based	issues,	such	as	the	gay	rights	movement);	see also	
Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson,	Off Center: the Republican revolution and the erosion 
of American Democracy	(2005)	(contextualizing	the	conservative	Republican	Revolution	mid-
90s	success	as	led	by	Newt	Gingrich).	
27	 See	S.932,	104th	Cong.	§	8	(1995)	available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:S.932	
(re-introduced	in	1996	as	S.2056).	
28	 Human	Rights	Campaign,	Timeline:	The	Employment	Non-Discrimination	Act,	http://www.
hrc.org/issues/5636.htm	(tracking	the	legislative	history	of	ENDA).	
29	 H.R. 1863: The Employment Non-Discrimination Act Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Programs 
of the H. Comm. on Small Businesses,	104th	Cong.	143	(1996)	(statement	of	Chai	Feldblum)	available at 
http://ia311312.us.archive.org/2/items/hr1863employment00unit/hr1863employment00unit.
pdf.	(explaining	differences	in	the	legislation).	
30	 See	S.869,	105th	Cong.	§	9	(1997)	available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=105_cong	_bills&docid=f:s869is.txt.pdf	(providing	religious	organization	exception).	
31	 See	Exec.	Order	No.	1308,	3	C.F.R.	191	(1998)	available at http://www.opm.gov/er/EO13087.
HTM	(amending	Executive	Order	11478	“by	substituting	‘age,	or	sexual	orientation’	for	‘or	age’”).	
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discrimination	on	the	bases	of	race,	color,	sex,	religion,	and	national	ori-
gin.32	Later	in	the	year,	the	House	of	Representatives	handily	rejected	
the	Hefley	Amendment,	which	was	designed	to	prohibit	federal	funds	
in	the	executive	order’s	enforcement.33	The	following	year	ENDA	was	
re-introduced	with	the	same	1997	exemption	language,	34	but	it	again	
failed	to	pass	Congress,	making	President	Clinton’s	executive	order	the	
height	of	the	bill’s	success	approaching	the	new	century.
ENDA’s	 religious	 organization	 exemption	 ballooned	 in	 2001	
when	the	for-profit	exception	was	stripped	from	the	provision.35	The	
revised	 provision	 simply	 read,	 “[t]his	 Act	 shall	 not	 apply	 to	 a	 reli-
gious	organization.”36	It	is	unclear	from	the	legislative	history	why	the	
broad	exception	was	further	expanded	in	2001.	In	2002,	however,	sev-
eral	bill	witnesses	supported	the	legislation	during	the	Senate	Health,	
Education,	Labor	and	Pensions	Committee	hearing,	including	primary	
bill	sponsor,	Patty	Murray	(D-Washington).37	The	religious	exemption,	
like	in	years’	past,38	became	an	even	more	attractive	proverbial	carrot	
for	LGBT	advocates,	instead	of	being	seen	as	a	stumbling	block	to	the	
legislation’s	 efficacy.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 broadness	 of	 the	 religious	
exemption	remained	a	political	selling	point	in	2003,39	even	when	such	
language,	as	the	proverbial	“stick,”	had	the	potential	to	hurt	gay	work-
ers	at	religious	organizations.
This	history	reveals	an	interestingly	nuanced	evolution	since	1994.	
The	 original	 ENDA	 bill	 contained	 a	 broad	 exception	 that	 only	 con-
tained	a	small	for-profit	exception;	however,	seven	years	later	in	2001,	
the	religious	exemption	expanded	to	even	broader	to	become	a	blanket	
exception	for	religious	organizations.	The	politics	of	compromise	trace	
closely	to	the	bill’s	political	palpability.	ENDA	transformed	to	become	
increasingly	 viable	 to	 lawmakers	 facing	 tremendous	 pressure	 from	
32	 Exec.	Order	No.	11478,	3	C.F.R.	803	(1966-1970)	available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/11478.html	(providing	for	equal	employment	opportunity	
in	the	Federal	Government).	
33	 See Human	Rights	Campaign,	supra	note	28.	
34	 See	S.	1276,	106th	Cong.	§9	(1999)	available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=106_cong_	 bills&docid=f:s1276is.txt.pdf	 (prohibiting	 employment	 discrimination	
on	the	basis	of	sexual	orientation).	
35	 S.	 1284,	 107th	 Cong.	 §	 9	 (2001)	 available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=107_cong_	bills&docid=f:s1284is.txt.pdf	(exempting	religious	organizations).	
36	 Id.	
37	 The Employment Non-Discrimination Act Hearing Before the Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions,	107th	Cong.	5	(2002)	(statement	of	Sen.	Patty	Murray),	available at http://frwebgate.ac-
cess.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid=f:78032.pdf.	See also id.	at	
18	(statement	by	Senator	Hillary	Clinton);	id.	at	39	(statement	by	Senator	Edward	Kennedy);	id.	at	
34	(statement	by	Richard	Womack,	Dir.	AFL-CIO	Civil	Rights	Dep’t).	
38	 See, e.g,	H.R.	1863:	The	Employment	Non-Discrimination	Act	Hearing	Before	the	Subcomm.	on	
Gov’t	Programs	of	the	H.	Comm.	on	Small	Businesses,	supra	note	29,	at	2	(“ENDA	is	not	a	law	that	
would	require	religious	organizations	to	follow	it,	as	religious	organization	would	be	exempt,	as	
would	very	small	businesses,	those	with	15	or	fewer	employees.”).	
39	 	See S.1705,	108th	Cong.	§9	(2003)	available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=108_cong_	bills&docid=f:s1705is.txt.pdf.	
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powerful	 conservative	 constituencies	 as	 the	 LGBT	 movement	 made	
tangible	gains	in	the	marriage	equality	battle,	and	gained	more	favor-
able	visibility	among	Americans,	 in	general.40	Upon	approaching	 the	
legislative	climax	in	2007,	a	year	in	which	it	appeared	as	if	the	ENDA	
could	make	real	progress,	lawmakers	and	leading	advocates	accepted	
concessions	that	would	deeply	divide	the	LGBT	communities.41	During	
the	“year	of	compromise,”	the	religious	exemption	was	modified	once	
again,	yet	gained	very	little	attention.
B. The Year of Compromises
Representative	 Barney	 Frank	 (D-Mass.)	 re-introduced	 ENDA	 in	
2007	 with	 an	 infamous	 omission	 —	 the	 bill	 did	 not	 include	 “gender	
identity”	in	its	protections.	Since	2003,	the	activist	political	landscape	
had	changed,	and	many	LGBT	advocates	expected	“gender	identity”	to	
be	included	in	the	new	version	of	the	bill.42	As	a	protected	status,	“gen-
der	identity”43	primarily	protects	transgender44	people	from	discrimi-
nation.	 It	 also	 provides	 broader	 protection	 for	 lesbian,	 gay,	 bisexual,	
and	 some	 heterosexual	 people	 who	 do	 not	 conform	 to	 conventional	
gender	norms.45	Widely	seen	as	a	full	set	of	protections,	“sexual	orienta-
40	 See Jeffrey	M.	Jones, Americans’ Opposition to Gay Marriage Eases Slightly,	Gallup	Organization	
(May	24,	2010)	http://www.gallup.com/	poll/128291/americans-opposition-gay-marriage-eas-
es-slightly.aspx	(documenting	a	positive	trend	toward	same-sex	marriage	since	2004).
41	 See infra	note	49.
42	 See, e.g.,	 Julie	 R.	 Enzer,	 Legislative Bargain Frays Some in LGBT Community,	 Women’s eNews	
(Nov.	 16,	 2007)	 available at womensenews.org/	 story/lesbian-and-transgender/071116/legisla-
tive-bargain-frays-some-in-lgbt	community	(“gender	identity”	was	in	the	original	version	of	the	
bill	submitted	to	the	House,	only	to	be	stripped	during	committee	to	ensure	House	passage)	(“The	
original	bill	was	expected	to	pass	out	of	the	House	and	the	Senate	relatively	easily	.	.	.	But	in	late	
September,	Frank,	who	is	openly	gay	and	the	bill’s	lead	sponsor,	told	advocates	that	ENDA	—	the	
Employment	Non-Discrimination	Act	—	did	not	have	the	votes	to	pass	the	House	if	it	included	
gender	identity”).	
43	 See Understanding Transgender: Frequently Asked Questions about Transgender 
People, National Center for Transgender Rights	6	(May	2009),	available at http://www.tran-
sequality.org/Resources/	 NCTE_UnderstandingTrans.pdf	 (“Gender	 identity	 refers	 to	 the	 way	
you	understand	yourself	and	your	gender.	It	is	about	the	internal	sense	of	masculinity	or	feminin-
ity	that	a	person	feels.”).	
44	 Id.	at	1–2.	
45	 Cf.	Lambda Legal’s Analysis of Stripped Down Version of ENDA: Gender Identity Protections Gone and 
Inadequate Protections for Lesbians, Gay Men and Bisexuals,	Lambda Legal (Oct.	1,	2007),	available 
at http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/lambda-legals-analysis-enda.html	 (discussing	 how	
the	absence	of	language	protecting	lesbians,	gays,	and	bisexuals	that	do	not	conform	to	the	em-
ployer’s	idea	of	how	a	man	or	woman	should	look	and	act	is	a	loophole	that	allows	employers	to	
escape	liability	for	discrimination	by	claiming	their	conduct	was	based	on	gender	expression).
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tion,	gender	identity	and	expression”	became	the	policy	archetype	for	
non-discrimination	laws	for	which	activists	across	the	country	fought.46
Transgender-inclusive	 non-discrimination	 laws	 passed	 in	 several	
jurisdictions	 during	 the	 intervening	 time	 between	 ENDA’s	 2003	 and	
2007	introductions.47	Therefore,	the	absence	of	“gender	identity,”	and	
its	 justification	from	Barney	Frank	and	other	prominent	LGBT	advo-
cacy	 groups,	 most	 notably	 the	 Human	 Rights	 Campaign,	 ignited	
a	 firestorm	 of	 controversy.48	 The	 bill	 ultimately	 passed	 the	 House	 of	
Representatives	but	it	died	at	Senate	chambers.49	Some	moderate	law-
makers	 were	 reluctant	 to	 support	 a	 version	 of	 the	 bill	 that	 included	
“gender	 identity,”50	 but	 the	 political	 compromise	 was	 not	 an	 accept-
able	conciliation	to	many	in	the	LGBT	community,	as	evidenced	by	the	
sharp	division	arising	from	the	national	debate.
Lawmakers’	failure	to	update	ENDA	to	include	“gender	identity”	
protections	earned	the	bill	a	great	deal	of	attention,	but	the	2007	version	
contained	a	critical	change	that	was	overshadowed	by	the	controversy	
—	a	slightly	narrower	religious	exemption	provision.	The	2007	exemp-
tion	was	narrower	than	recent	years’	provisions	that	granted	wholesale	
46	 See Scope of Explicitly Transgender-Inclusive Anti-Discrimination Laws, Transgender Law & Pol’y 
Inst & Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force (Apr.	2006)	(showing	that	eight	states	and	eighty-one	
localities	ban	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	gender	identity	and	expression).	Many	of	these	juris-
dictions	recently	passed	these	laws	within	the	last	ten	years.	
47	 See id;	see also Kate	Linthicum,	Transgender Rights Advocates See a Gradual Series of Victories,	L.A. 
Times, May	26,	2010,	available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/26/nation/la-na-trans-
gender-20100526	(mentioning	that	many	state	and	local	ordinances	have	banned	discrimination	
based	 on	 gender	 identity);	 Non-Discrimination Laws That Include Gender Identity and Expression,	
Transgender Law & Pol’y Inst & Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force	(Feb.	17,	2001),	available at 
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/index.htm	 (detailing	 the	state	 jurisdictions	 that	have	
laws	prohibiting	discrimination	on	 the	basis	of	gender	expression	and	prohibiting	discrimina-
tion	 in	 public	 employment	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 gender	 identification);	 Years Passed Between Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity Expression,	Transgender Civ. Rts. Project (July	2007),	available 
at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact_sheets/years_passed_gie_so_7_07.
pdf	(displaying	the	county,	city,	or	states	that	added	sexual	orientation	to	its	anti-discrimination	
laws,	with	50	counties,	cities,	or	states	adding	the	provision	since	2003).	Transgender	advocates	
stressed	the	 importance	to	 include	gender	protections	 in	the	2007	version	of	ENDA	due	to	the	
significant	lag	between	the	passage	of	lesbian	and	gay	anti-discrimination	laws	and	transgender	
anti-discrimination	laws.	
48	 See,	e.g.,	Kilian	Melloy,	Dropping the ‘T: New Version of ENDA Does Not Protect Trans People,	EDGE 
Bos. (Oct.	 1,	 2007),	 available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/TF_in_news/07_1009/stories/14_
dropping_the_t.pdf	 (“LGBT	 leaders	 are	 furious	 over	 Frank’s	 maneuver,	 reported	 365Gay.com,	
adding	that	Rep.	Tammy	Baldwin	—	other	than	Frank,	Congress’	only	openly	gay	member	—	had	
withdrawn	her	sponsorship	of	ENDA	with	the	announcement	of	the	new	version.”).	
49	 See David	 Crary,	 New Impetus For Bill Banning Anti-Gay Bias for bill banning anti-gay 
bias at work,	 Guardian (Aug.	 28,	 2009),	 available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
feedarticle/8678991?FORM=ZZNR10	(“Frank	pushed	ENDA	in	2007,	but	it	foundered	because	of	
insufficient	backing	in	the	Senate	and	a	split	within	the	gay	and	transgender	communities.”).
50	 See Julie	 Bolcer,	 Centrist Democrats Balking at ENDA Vote, Advocate,	 May	 10,	 2010,	 available 
at http://www.advocate.com/News/Daily_News	/2010/05/10/Centrists_Democrats_Balking_
at_ENDA_Vote_/	(explaining	the	concerns	moderates	had	over	the	transgender	inclusive	legisla-
tion	affecting	their	chances	at	reelection).
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exemptions;	however,	it	still	remained	much	broader	than	Title	VII	of	
the	Civil	Rights	Act	of	1964,	under	which	the	2009	bill’s	exemption	is	
modeled.51	Title	VII’s	religious	organization	exemption	provides	in	rel-
evant	part:
This	 subchapter	 shall	 not	 apply	 to	 an	 employer	 with	
respect	.	.	.	to	a	religious	corporation,	association,	educa-
tional	institution,	or	society	with	respect	to	the	employ-
ment	of	individuals	of	a	particular	religion	to	perform	
work	connected	with	the	carrying	on	by	such	corpora-
tion,	association,	educational	institution,	or	society	of	its	
activities.52
Title	 VII’s	 religious	 organization	 exemption,	 also	 known	 as	 the	
ministerial	exception,53	is	narrowly	applicable	to	discrimination	on	the	
basis	 of	 religion	 by	 a	 religious	 organization.	 In	 some	 circumstances,	
religious	organizations’	secular	activities	may	fall	under	this	exemption	
as	well.	In	1978,	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	held	in	Corporation 
of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos.54	
that	the	exemption’s	application	to	secular	organizations	run	by	reli-
gious	 entities	 does	 not	 violate	 the	 First	Amendment’s	 Establishment	
Clause,55	 which	 bars	 religious	 endorsement	 by	 Congress.	 The	 Court	
applied	the	three-part	test	set	out	in	Lemon v. Kurtzman56	to	determine	
whether	 the	exemption’s	application	 to	 secular	activity	amounted	 to	
religious	“sponsorship.”57	It	concluded	that	the	exemption	did	not	rise	
to	the	level	of	an	Establishment	Clause	violation,	and	re-affirmed	that	
a	law	may	exhibit	“‘benevolent	neutrality	which	will	permit	religious	
exercise	 to	 exist	 without	 sponsorship	 and	 without	 interference.’”58	
51	 Compare infra	note	57	with	H.R.	2981,	111th	Cong.	(2009)	available at thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
query/F?c111:1:./temp/~c111JnzOcb:e11096:.	
52	 42	U.S.C.	§2000e-1(a).	
53	 See, e.g.,	Note	The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential Primary Duties Test,	
121	Harv. L. Rev.	1776,	1776	(2007	—	2008)	(describing	the	ministerial	exception	as	“allow[ing]	
religious	employers	to	avoid	liability	for	discrimination	when	making	employment	decisions	con-
cerning	employees	who	qualify	as	ministers.”	Cf.	Employment	Div.,	Dep’t	of	Human	Resources	
of	Oregon	v.	Smith,	494	U.S.	872	 (1990)	 (qualifying	 the	ministerial	exception	 that	was	expand-
ed	by	Amos	 to	 include	religious	function	employees).	But see	 Jack	M.	Battaglia,	Religion, Sexual 
Orientation, and Self-Realization: First Amendment Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws,	76	U. Det. 
Mercy L. Rev.	189,	271–73	(1999)	 (noting	that	an	eminent	 legal	scholar	believes	 that	 the	Smith	
holding	 will	 not	 affect	 the	 broader	 ministerial	 rule	 announced	 in	Amos	 that	 permits	 religious	
organizations	 to	engage	 in	religious	and	certain	non-religious	discrimination,	against	 religious	
function	employees).	
54	 483	U.S.	327	(1987)	[hereinafter	“Amos”].
55	 Id.	at	330.	
56	 Lemon v. Kurzman,	403	U.S.	602	(1971)	(“First,	the	statute	must	have	a	secular	legislative	pur-
pose;	second,	its	principal	or	primary	effect	must	be	one	that	neither	advances	nor	inhibits	religion	
.	.	.	finally,	the	statute	must	not	foster	‘an	excessive	government	entanglement	with	religion.’”).	
57	 See Amos,	483	U.S.	at	337.	
58	 Id.	at	334	(quoting	Walz	v.	Tax	Comm’n,	397	U.S.	664,	669	(1970)).
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Despite	 the	 Court’s	 sweeping	 language,	 its	 ruling	 kept	 the	 ministe-
rial	exemption	limited	to	religious	discrimination	by	secular,	but	reli-
giously-affiliated	organizations.	Altogether,	Title	VII’s	exemption	is	not	
tantamount	to	wholesale	religious	organization	exemption.
The	ENDA	of	2007	 is	not	as	 limited	 in	 its	 religious	exceptions	as	
Title	VII.	Under	2007’s	Section	6	of	ENDA:
(a)	 In	 General-	 This	Act	 shall	 not	 apply	 to	 any	 of	 the	
employment	practices	of	a	religious	corporation,	asso-
ciation,	educational	institution,	or	society	which	has	as	
its	 primary	 purpose	 religious	 ritual	 or	 worship	 or	 the	
teaching	or	spreading	of	religious	doctrine	or	belief.
(b)	 Certain	 Employees-	 For	 any	 religious	 corporation,	
association,	 educational	 institution,	 or	 society	 that	 is	
not	wholly	exempt	under	subsection	(a),	this	Act	shall	
not	apply	with	respect	to	the	employment	of	individu-
als	whose	primary	duties	consist	of	teaching	or	spread-
ing	 religious	 doctrine	 or	 belief,	 religious	 governance,	
supervision	 of	 a	 religious	 order,	 supervision	 of	 per-
sons	teaching	or	spreading	religious	doctrine	or	belief,	
or	 supervision	 or	 participation	 in	 religious	 ritual	 or	
worship.
(c)	 Conformity	 to	 Religious	 Tenets-	 Under	 this	 Act,	 a	
religious	 corporation,	 association,	 educational	 insti-
tution,	 or	 society	 may	 require	 that	 applicants	 for,	 and	
employees	 in,	 similar	 positions	 conform	 to	 those	 reli-
gious	 tenets	 that	 such	 corporation,	 association,	 insti-
tution,	 or	 society	 declares	 significant.	 Under	 this	 Act,	
such	 a	 declaration	 by	 a	 religious	 corporation,	 associa-
tion,	educational	institution	or	society	stating	which	of	
its	religious	tenets	are	significant	shall	not	be	subject	to	
judicial	or	administrative	review.	Any	such	declaration	
made	for	purposes	of	this	Act	shall	be	admissible	only	
for	proceedings	under	this	Act.59
This	exemption	is	much	broader	than	Title	VII’s	exemption	for	two	
reasons.	 First,	 the	 exemption’s	 language	 does	 not	 contain	 a	 narrow-
ing	 principle	 that	 restricts	 religious	 organizations	 to	 discriminate	 on	
religious	grounds	only,	as	seen	 in	 the	Title	VII’s	 language,	“individu-
als of a particular religion to perform work connected	with	 the	 carrying	
on	by	such	corporation,	association,	educational	institution,	or	society	
of	 its	 activities”	 (emphasis	 added).60	 Instead,	 ENDA’s	 exemption	 is	
59	 	H.R.	3685,	110th	Cong.	§	6	(2007)	available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=110_cong_	bills&docid=f:h3685pcs.txt.pdf.	
60	 See Melloy, supra	note	48.	
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applicable	to	“individuals	whose	primary	duties	consist	of	teaching	or	
spreading	 religious	doctrine	or	belief,	 religious	governance,	 supervi-
sion	of	a	religious	order,	supervision	of	persons	teaching	or	spreading	
religious	doctrine	or	belief,	or	supervision	or	participation	in	religious	
ritual	 or	 worship.”61	 The	 narrowing	 principle	 —	 that	 religious	 orga-
nizations	 can	 only	 discriminate	 on	 religious	 grounds	 —	 is	 absent	 in	
ENDA’s	exemption,	which	permits	religious	organizations	to	discrimi-
nate	 against	 individuals	 whose	 primary	 duties	 consist	 of	 a	 range	 of	
activities	within	the	organization.	Although,	at	first	glance	it	appears	
that	the	2007	ENDA	language	may	simply	be	more	specific	than	Title	
VII,	the	absence	of	the	principle	is	paramount	as	the	principal	language	
is	missing	an	analytical	analogue	pertaining	to	LGBT	people	and	reli-
gious	activities.	In	other	words,	a	loophole	can	be	read	into	the	legisla-
tive	language,	in	which	the	exemption	excuses	religious	organizations	
if	organizations’	teachings	reject	homosexuality	(broadly	conceived	to	
include	transgender	people).	A	religious	organization	may	easily	argue	
that	 an	 openly	 gay	 person,	 a	 person	 engaging	 in	 sex	 with	 same-sex	
partner(s),	or	a	gender	non-conforming	person	violates	the	organiza-
tion’s	tenants,	and	therefore,	cannot	perform	their	work-related	duties	
as	 a	 person	 expressly	 violating	 core	 teachings,	 even	 if	 that	 person’s	
work	performance	is	in	no	way	implicated.	Therefore,	the	absence	of	a	
meaningful	narrowing	principle	for	LGBT	people	within	the	2007	ver-
sion	of	ENDA	effectively	broadens	the	religious	exemption.62
Moreover,	Section	6(c)	of	ENDA	contained	explicit	 language	 that	
precluded	judicial	review	of	the	invocation	of	the	religious	exemption.	
The	section	provided	that,	“[u]nder	 this	Act,	such	a	declaration	by	a	
religious	 corporation,	 association,	 educational	 institution	 or	 society	
stating	which	of	its	religious	tenets	are	significant	shall	not	be	subject	
to	 judicial	 or	 administrative	 review.”63	Although	 there	 are	 legitimate	
reasons	to	dissuade	courts	from	scrutinizing	professed	beliefs,64	it	has	
61	 483	U.S.	327,	330	(1987). 
62	 There	was	explicit	language	in	the	legislation	itself	that	displayed	the	bill’s	authors’	intent	to	
broaden	 the	 exemption	 in	 this	 regard.	 See H.R.	 2015,	 Section	 6(c),	 available at thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp	/~c11014HekY:e11850:	(“Under	this	Act,	a	religious	corporation,	
association,	educational	institution,	or	society	may	require	that	applicants	for,	and	employees	in,	
similar	positions	conform	to	those	religious	tenants	that	such	corporation,	association,	institution,	
or	society	declares	significant.”).	It	is	my	personal	speculation	that	such	plainly	biased	language	
would	have	been	stripped	in	the	Senate,	which	would	not	have	come	at	such	a	huge	cost	to	the	
language’s	proponents,	because	of	the	other	exemption	language	is	the	bill	could	have	been	con-
strued	to	have	a	similar	effect.
63	 Id.
64	 The	governing	standard	among	U.S.	courts	is	to	avoid	scrutinizing	religious	beliefs.	See Richard	
Garnett,	A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?,	84	Notre Dame L. 
Rev.	837,	837	(2009)	(“[T]he	program	organized	by	the	Section	on	Law	and	Religion	presented	for	
consideration	the	claim	that	‘the	United	States	Supreme	Court	has	shown	an	increasing	unwilling-
ness	to	engage	in	deciding	matters	that	relate	to	the	interpretation	of	religious	practice	and	belief.’	
The	Court,	 it	was	proposed,	 is	—	more	and	more	—	taking	a	 ‘hands-off	approach	 to	religious	
doctrine	.	.	.’”)(citations	omitted).	See Watts	v.	Florida	Intern.	University,	495	F.3d	1289,	1294	(11th	
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been	a	historically	prudential	issue	for	the	courts.	The	concern	is	that	
if	 codified	 into	 law,	 then	 many	 religious	 organizations	 could	 have	
been	shielded	from	judicial	review.	Such	construction	was	probably	a	
means,	as	a	practical	matter,	to	guard	religious	organizations	from	legal	
liability.65
Some	 commentators	 interpreted	 the	 religious	 exemption	 to	 still	
maintain	some	coverage,	however	small,	despite	 its	far-reaching	lan-
guage.66	These	commentators	argued	that	the	provision	contained	nar-
rowing	principles	like	those	that	within	Title	VII	because	the	exemption	
did	not	apply	 to	 religious	organizations	 that	did	not	have	“religious	
ritual	or	worship	or	the	teaching	or	spreading	of	religious	doctrine	or	
belief”	as	its	primary	purpose.67	The	exemption,	it	was	argued,	also	did	
not	extend	to	“employment	of	individuals	whose	primary	duties	con-
sisted	of	something	other	than”	core	religious	activities.68
This	argument	ignores	two	aspects	of	the	provision.	First,	it	ignores	
the	 common-sense	 fact	 that	 virtually	 all	 religious	 organizations	 pos-
sess	a	primary	purpose	to	engage	in	religious	worship	or	spread	a	reli-
gious	 doctrine,	 even	 if	 such	 doctrine	 is	 in	 the	 form	 of	 service	 to	 the	
community.	Second,	regarding	religious	activity,	this	position	ignores	
the	 absence	 of	 a	 relevant narrowing	 principle	 to	 preclude	 religious	
organizations	from	claiming	the	exemption	under	the	pretense	that	a	
“gay	lifestyle”	disrupts	the	“teaching	or	spreading	religious	doctrine	
or	belief.”	A	critical	examination	of	the	provision	shows	that	its	parts,	
notwithstanding	 its	 facial	 language,	 are	 tantamount	 to	 a	 wholesale	
exemption,	when	paired	with	the	judicial	review	preclusion	provision.	
Importantly,	the	2009	ENDA	bill	finally	amended	the	religious	exemp-
tion	provision	to	be	consistent	with	Title	VII,	which	more	reasonably	
provides	LGBT	people	with	robust	civil	rights	protections.
The	history	of	ENDA’s	broad	religious	organization	exemption	is	a	
breath-taking	development	in	civil	rights	law.	It	is	difficult	to	imagine	
the	Civil	Rights	Act	of	1964,	for	example,	granting	blanket	exemptions	
to	Southern	states.	Such	broad	exceptions,	as	drafted	in	the	2007	and	
prior	 ENDA	 bills,	 exclude	 many	 LGBT	 people	 who	 wish	 to	 work	 at	
religious	 and	 religiously-affiliated	 organizations.	 This	 has	 been	 par-
ticularly	onerous	as	the	religious	for-profit	industry	grows	into	a	vast	
Cir.	2007)	(explaining	that	core	religious	beliefs	must	be	‘sincerely	held’	to	fall	within	Free	Exercise	
Clause).
65	 See Watts	v.	Florida	Intern.	Univ.,	495	F.3d	1289,	1294	(11th	Cir.	2007)	(explaining	that	core	reli-
gious	beliefs	must	be	‘sincerely	held’	to	fall	within	Free	Exercise	Clause).
66	 See, e.g.,	Memorandum	from	Drew	Asbby	and	Matt	Clark,	American	Center	for	Law	&	Justice,	
to	 Drew	 Ryan	 and	 Erik	 Zimmerman,	American	 Center	 for	 Law	 &	 Justice	 on	 the	 Employment	
Non-Discrimination	Act	of	2007	5	(May	1,	2007),	available at http://www.advanceusa.org/pdf/
ENDA	_Memo.pdf.	
67	 Id.
68	 Id.
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enterprise69	 to	 include	 gyms,70	 music	 labels	 and	 publishing	 houses.71	
Worse,	it	is	a	remarkable	example	of	religious	over-accommodation	in	
policy-making	that	is	unsettling	for	civil	rights	supporters.
Conservative	Christian	political	organizations,	known	collectively	
as	 the	 “Religious	 Right,”72	 possess	 significant	 political	 capital	 that	
likely	 influenced	 ENDA’s	 religious	 exemption	 construction	 over	 the	
last	sixteen	years.	This	political	movement	is	led	by	a	number	of	well-
financed	and	visible	organizations,	 such	as	Focus	on	 the	Family	and	
the	Family	Research	Council.73	These	and	other	related	organizations	
have	vigorously	opposed	LGBT	civil	rights,	effectively	slowing	federal	
legislative	 efforts	 to	 extend	 rights	 to	 LGBT	 people.74	 ENDA	 has	 also	
met	strong	opposition	from	the	Religious	Right.	In	2009,	the	National	
Religious	Broadcasters	testified	before	the	Senate,	arguing	that	the	cur-
rent	Title	VII-like	exemption	is	“fatally	insufficient”	to	protect	religious	
employers.75
Religious	Right	organizations	oppose	ENDA	and	other	LGBT	civil	
rights	laws	based	on	a	Christian	evangelical	belief	that	homosexuality	
is	 immoral.76	The	nexus	among	sexuality,	gender	 identity,	workplace	
69	 See	 Mega Churches Mean Big Business,	 CNN,	 Jan.	 21,	 2010,	 available at http://www.cnn.
com/2010/WORLD/americas/01/21/religion.mega.church.christian/index.html	(detailing	that	
mega-churches	make	about	$6.5	million	a	year	and	can	accommodate	up	to	15,000	people).	
70	 See Lisa	L.	Colangelo,	United	Presbyterian Church Pays Bills pays bills with Rock Fitness Center 
for Body and Soul,	 N.Y. Daily News (May	 8,	 2010),	 available at http://www.nydailynews.com/
ny_local/queens/2010/05/09/2010-05-09_united_presbyterian_church_pays_bills_with_rock_
fitness_center_for_body_and_soul.html	(noting	that	the	church	now	shares	its	building	with	the	
Fitness	Center	to	cover	maintenance	costs).
71	 See	Luisa	Kroll,	Christian	Capitalism:	Megachurches,	Megabusinesses,	Forbes (Sept.	17,	2003),	
available at http://www.forbes.com/2003	 /09/17/cz_lk_0917megachurch.html	 (listing	 the	 vast	
enterprises	 of	 mega-churches,	 including	 record	 deals,	 television	 programs,	 and	 books	 sold	 at	
Walmart,	Costco,	Barnes	and	Noble,	and	Borders).
72	 See, e.g., William Martin,	 With God on Our Side: the rise of the Religious Right in 
America	(1996)	(tracing	the	old	Religious	Right	movement,	which	was	borne	in	the	1960s,	and	its	
evolution	into	the	New	Religious	Right,	which	carries	on	the	conservative	political	mantel	to	forge	
Christian	power	in	politics	as	part	of	a	righteous	vision	to	restore	traditional	“American”	values).
73	 See Bill	Berkowitz,	Religious Right Bringing in ‘More Money Than Ever,’	IPS News (Dec.	21,	2007),	
available at http://ipsnews.net/	print.asp?idnews=40575)	(listing	the	amount	of	money	amassed	
by	Focus	on	Families	and	similar	organizations)	Focus	on	Families	took	in	$142.2	million	in	2006;	
Focus	on	Families	Action,	$14.6	million;	the	Family	Research	Council,	$10.3	million;	the	Alliance	
Defense	 Fund,	 $26.1	 million;	 American	 Family	 Association,	 $16.9	 million;	 and	 CBN,	 $236.3	
million.	
74	 See Cece	Cox,	To Have or To Hold — Or Not: The Influence of the Christian Right on Gay Marriage 
Laws in the Netherlands, Canada, and the United States,	 14	Law & Sexuality: Rev. Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual & Transgender Legal Issues	1,	40-47	(2005)	(explaining	that	the	Religious	Right	played	
an	instrumental	role	in	blocking	gay	marriage	in	the	United	States	as	compared	to	other	countries	
that	extended	marriage	rights	 to	LGBT	people	who	did	not	have	strong	conservative	religious	
opposition).
75	 E.g.,	 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009: Hearing of S. 1584 Before the Sen. Comm. on 
Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions,	111th	Cong.	(2009)	(written	testimony	of	Craig	L.	Parshall,	Senior	
Vice-President	and	General	Counsel	of	the	National	Religious	Broadcasters),	available at http://
content.nrb.org/	webdocs/Advocacy/ENDA_Senate_Test_11_2009.pdf.	
76	 See, e.g.,	Family	Research	Council,	Help	Stop	the	ENDA.	Religious Liberty,	http://www.frc.org/
get.cfm?i=AL10D01	(“ENDA	will	give	Washington	liberals	virtually	unlimited	power	to	force	ev-
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protection,	and	morality	is	unclear,77	but	Religious	Right	organizations	
have	 long-advanced	 the	 position	 that	 civil	 rights	 laws	 that	 mandate	
non-discrimination	 infringe	 religious	 freedom.78	 ENDA’s	 perceived	
threat	 is	 even	 more	 deeply	 felt	 as	 the	 religious	 exemption	 has	 been	
narrowed	 to	Title	VII’s	 scope.	Few	other	 religious	voices	have	 taken	
the	anti-LGBT	civil	rights	mantel	like	the	conservative	Christian	bloc,79	
have	 been	 as	 consistently	 vocal	 against	 ENDA,80	 suggesting	 that	 the	
Religious	Right	has	been	a	driving	force	behind	the	religious	exemp-
tion	since	ENDA’s	inception.	This	comment	will	not	elaborate	on	the	
Religious	 Right’s	 long-fought	 opposition	 to	 ENDA;	 however,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 emphasize	 that	 a	 particular	 religious	 constituency	 has	
profoundly	influenced	ENDA’s	religious	exemption.	Lawmakers	have	
catered	to	this	specific	constituency	in	the	past,	but	finally	seem	willing	
to	abandon	its	past	over-accommodation.
III. TIppIng The Balance Toward relIgIous  
over-accommodaTIon
In	Lemon v. Amos,	Justice	Sandra	Day	O’Connor	noted:
These	cases	involve	a	Government	decision	to	lift	from	
a	nonprofit activity	of	a	religious	organization	the	bur-
den	of	demonstrating	that	the	particular	nonprofit	activ-
ity	is	religious	as	well	as	the	burden	of	refraining	from	
discriminating	on	the	basis	of	religion	.	.	.	[I]n	my	view	
the	objective	observer	should	perceive	the	Government	
action	as	an	accommodation	of	the	exercise	of	religion	
rather	than	as	a	Government	endorsement	of	religion.81
Justice	O’Connor’s	concurrence	highlighted	the	long-debated	ten-
sion	between	First	Amendment	principles	that	constitutionally	permit	
the	federal	government	to	uphold	the	free	exercise	of	religion,	and,	at	
ery	business	with	more	than	15	employees	to	embrace	immoral	sexual	behavior	as	normal	and	
worthy	of	celebration	.	.	.	or	face	harsh	federal	sanctions.”).	
77	 Infra Part	II.
78	 See James	Tillman,	New Documentary on Homosexual Threat to Religious Freedom,	Lifesitenews.
com (May	13,	2010)	(reporting	on	a	Family	Research	Council	documentary	warning	about	ENDA’s	
threat	to	religious	freedom	to	reject	homosexuality	as	moral).
79	 See supra note	26	(describing	the	Religious	Right	as	a	fundamentalist,	conservative	Christian	
coalition).	
80	 See, e.g.,	supra	note	26	(Parshall	from	the	National	Religious	Broadcasters,	a	Religious	Right	pro-
gramming	organization,	is	the	only	other	religious	group	represented	at	the	hearings	other	than	
the	Reform	Jewish	organization,	as	it	served	as	a	nominal	voice	for	the	conservative	bloc	for	the	
most	recent	round	of	ENDA	hearings;	other	Religious	Right	organizations	have	testified	against	
the	bill	in	the	past).	
81	 Amos,	483	U.S.	at	348–49	(concurring	opinion).
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the	same	time,	mandate	against	excessive	entanglement	with	religion.82	
The	First	Amendment	seemingly	creates	a	balance	in	its	 limited	text,	
which	provides,	“Congress	shall	make	no	law	respecting	an	establish-
ment	of	religion,	or	prohibiting	the	free	exercise	thereof	.	.	.	.”83	However,	
the	meaning	behind	the	Establishment	Clause	and	Free	Exercise	Clause	
regarding	federal	statutory	regulation	is	a	constant	subject	of	debate.84
The	 theoretical	 balance	 between	 these	 two	 principles	 —	 govern-
ment’s	preservation	of	free	religious	exercise	and	its	limitations	—	cre-
ates	a	 tension	that	sometimes	makes	 them	competing	principles.85	 In	
the	context	of	LGBT	rights	and	religious	organizations	 that	object	 to	
homosexuality,	lawmakers	are	forced	to	choose	which	rights	to	more	
firmly	secure.	Based	on	ENDA’s	former	blanket	exceptions	it	appears	
as	 if	 this	 choice	 has	 been	 relatively	 easy,	 but	 as	 LGBT	 relationships	
becomes	normalized,	lawmakers	had	to	approach	a	fairer	balance.	This	
section	 will	 discuss	 judicial	 interpretations	 of	 the	 Establishment	 and	
Free	Exercise	Clauses,	 examine	 the	principles’	 tensions	within	LGBT	
civil	 rights,	 analyze	 the	 nexus	 between	 First	Amendment	 principles	
with	 employment,	 and	 conclude	 by	 arguing	 that	 ENDA’s	 previous	
exemptions	over-accommodated	certain	religious	organizations.
A. The esTAblishmenT ClAuse And Religious FReedom TighTRope
Courts	 have	 been	 called	 upon	 to	 discern	 the	 Establishment	 and	
Free	Exercise	Clauses	meanings	because	the	United	States	Constitution	
provides	 precious	 little	 textual	 guidance	 regarding	 Congress’	 role	 in	
upholding	religious	freedom	and	avoiding	its	entanglement	with	reli-
gion.86	The	Establishment	Clause	contains	a	much	clearer	jurispruden-
tial	history	than	the	Free	Exercise	Clause,	yet	the	relationship	between	
these	clauses	in	case	application	remains	equivocal.
The	 leading	case	 interpreting	 the	Establishment	Clause	 in	a	gov-
ernment	 regulatory	 context	 is	 Lemon v. Kurtzman,	 decided	 in	 1971.87	
82	 Id. at	346–49.
83	 U.S. Const.	amend.	I.	
84	 See, generally,	 Daniel	 Conkle,	 Constitutional	 law:	 the	 religion	 clauses	 (2d	 ed.	 2009);	 Eugene 
Volokh,	 The religion clauses and related statutes: problems, cases, and policy argu-
ments (2006);	Jesse Choper,	Securing religious liberty: principles for judicial interpreta-
tion of the religion clauses	(1995).
85	 The	prevalent	view	among	law	scholars	is	that	the	Religion	Clauses	are	often	in	conflict.	See	
Jesse	H.	Choper,	The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict,	41	U. Pitt. 
L. Rev.	673,	673-701	(1980)	(explaining	the	courts	have	developed	independent	jurisprudence	to	
harmonize	 the	 Religion	 Clauses	 despite	 their	 seemingly	 disparate	 mandates).	 In	 my	 view,	 the	
Religion	Clauses	are	not	necessarily	in	conflict;	instead,	they	create	the	confines	between	which	
the	government	must	reasonably	balance.	This	perspective,	unlike	the	prevalent	view,	appears	
throughout	the	essay.
86	 See Kent	Greenawalt,	Secularism, Religion, and Liberal Democracy in the United States,	30	Cardozo 
L. Rev.	2383,	2392–2400	(2009)	(explaining	that	the	Constitution’s	Religion	Clauses	fail	to	inform	
the	law	as	to	religion’s	proper	governmental	and	public	roles).	
87	 403	U.S.	602	(1971).
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The	case	created	a	three-part	test	designed	to	“draw	lines	with	refer-
ence	 to	 the	 three	main	evils	against	which	 the	Establishment	Clause	
was	intended	to	afford	protection:	‘sponsorship,	financial	support,	and	
active	involvement	of	the	sovereign	in	religious	activity.’”88	The	Lemon	
test	requires	that	a	statute	must	have	a	secular	legislative	purpose;	con-
tain	a	primary	effect	 that	neither	advances	nor	 inhibits	 religion;	and	
it	 must	 not	 foster	 an	 “excessive	 entanglement”	 with	 religion.89	 The	
Burger	Court	broadly	construed	the	Establishment	Clause’s	purpose,	
in	which	a	statute	that	“respects”	religion	may	be	impermissible	 if	 it	
may	lead	to	state	religious	endorsement.90
Later	 Establishment	 Clause	 cases	 have	 elaborated	 on	 the	 Lemon 
test’s	final	element	—	excessive	entanglement	—	as	an	inquiry	into	“the	
character	and	purposes	of	the	benefited	institutions,	the	nature	of	the	
aid	that	the	State	provides,	and	the	resulting	relationship	between	the	
government	 and	 religious	 authority.”91	 The	 “entanglement”	 element	
is	generally	viewed	as	the	government’s	attempt	to	maintain	neutral-
ity	 toward	 religion.92	 Some	 courts,	 where	 appropriate,	 have	 utilized	
Justice	O’Connor’s	“refined	Lemon	test”93	which	replaces	the	entangle-
ment	element	with	the	“endorsement	test”	that	holds	“the	government	
impermissibly	endorses	religion	if	its	conduct	has	either	(1)	the	purpose	
or	(2)	the	effect	of	conveying	a	message	that	religion	or	a	particular	reli-
gious	belief	is	favored	or	preferred.”94	Therefore,	governmental	action	
that	appears	to	endorse	or	disapprove	of	religion	from	the	perspective	
of	an	objective	and	informed	observer	is	violative	of	the	Establishment	
Clause.95
The	Free	Exercise	Clause	is	usually	interpreted	as	protecting	against	
infringements	against	individuals’	religious	beliefs	or	practice.96	A	free	
exercise	 religious	claim	must	only	 show	 that	 it	 is	 religious	 in	nature	
and	sincerely	held	belief.97	The	criterion	to	determine	whether	a	prof-
fered	 belief	 is	 religious	 is	 governed	 by	 a	 three-factor	 test,	 including	
“an	attempt	to	address	fundamental	and	ultimate	questions	involving	
deep	and	imponderable	matters;	a	comprehensive	belief	system;	and	
88	 Id.	at	612	(quoting	Walz	v.	Tax	Comm’n,	397	U.S.	664,	668	(1970).
89	 Id.	at	613.	
90	 Id.	at	612.	
91	 Agostini	v.	Felton,	521	U.S.	203,	206	 (1997).	See also	Van	Orden	v.	Perry,	545	U.S.	677	 (2005);	
Mitchell	v.	Helms,	530	U.S.	793,	793–94	(2000).
92	 McCreary	Cnty.	v.	ACLU,	545	U.S.	844,	860	(2005).
93	 See Lynch	 v.	 Donnelly,	 465	 U.S.	 668,	 687–94	 (1984)	 (concurring	 opinion)	 (using	 the	 refined	
Lemon	test).	
94	 See, e.g.,	Bauchman	for	Bauchman	v.	West	High	School, 132	F.3d	542,	551	(10th	Cir.	1997)	(apply-
ing	Justice	O’Connor’s	refined	analysis).
95	 See	Catholic	League	for	Religious	&	Civil	Rights	v.	City	and	Cnty.	of	San	Francisco,	567	F.3d
595	(9th	Cir.	2009);	Green	v.	Haskell	Cnty.	Bd.	Board	of	Com’rs,	568	F.3d	784	(10th	Cir.	2009).
96	 See	School	Dist.	of	Abington	Tp.,	Pa.	v.	Schempp,	374	U.S.	203	(1963).
97	 See	Sutton	v.	Rasheed,	323	F.3d	236	(3d	Cir.	2003);	U.S.	v.	DeWitt,	95	F.3d	1374	(8th	Cir.	1996);	
Thomas	v.	Review	Bd.	of	Indiana	Emp’t	Sec.	Div.,	450	U.S.	707	(1981).
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the	presence	of	formal	and	external	signs	like	clergy	and	observance	of	
holidays.”98
The	 Supreme	 Court’s	 jurisprudence	 on	 governmental	 regulatory	
interests	related	to	religious	freedom	is	uneven.	In	Sherbert v. Verner,99	
the	Court	held	that	a	government	must	possess	a	compelling	interest	
in	its	religious	exercise	regulation.100	Nearly	thirty	years	later,	the	Court	
changed	course	in	Employment Division v. Smith	by	permitting	govern-
mental	action	merely	to	be	neutral	toward	religion.101	Congress	restored	
the	 Verner	 strict	 scrutiny	 requirement	 for	 governmental	 regulation	
in	the	Religious	Freedom	Restoration	Act102	 in	1993.	Yet	the	Supreme	
Court,	in	City of Boerne v. Flores,	ruled	the	Act’s	application	to	state	and	
local	governments	as	unconstitutional	on	the	grounds	that	its	remedial	
reach	was	incongruent	to	achieve	its	ends.103	This	jurisprudential	his-
tory	is	instructive	on	individual	religious	freedom	issues	but	may	not	
fully	inform	religious	organization	protections,	particularly	in	light	of	
secular	civil	rights	regulation.104
The	closest	courts	have	come	is	placing	limitations	on	the	govern-
mental	 role	 to	 preserve	 individual	 religious	 beliefs.	 In	 Bowen v. Roy,	
the	Supreme	Court	argued	that	the	First	Amendment	does	not	“require	
the	Government	 itself	 to	behave	 in	ways	 that	 the	 individual	believes	
will	further	his	or	her	spiritual	development	or	that	of	his	or	her	fam-
ily”	(italics	in	original).105	This	form	of	over-accommodation	is	rejected	
in	 recent	 federal	 Circuit	 cases,	 such	 as	 Cornerstone Christian Schools 
v. University Interscholastic League,106	 which	 held	 that	 a	 not-for-profit,	
inter-collegiate	 organization’s	 regulatory	 preclusion	 of	 non-public	
school	participation	did	not	infringe	on	the	plaintiff’s	religious	right	to	
enroll	his	son	in	private	school.107	Federal	courts’	rationales	in	Roy	and	
Cornerstone	 reinforce	 the	 necessary	 balance	 between	 reasonable	 and	
unreasonable	accommodation.
The	 federal	 government,	 within	 a	 constitutional	 context,	 occu-
pies	a	precarious	role	as	the	removed	protector	of	religious	freedom.	
Moreover,	as	Congress	legislates	within	a	pluralistic	society,	it	becomes	
increasingly	difficult	 to	reconcile	 this	dual	role.	Accordingly,	 the	ten-
98	 Id. at	251	(quoting	Africa	v.	Commonwealth	of	Pa.,	662	F.2d	1025,	1030	(3d	Cir.	1981)	(describing	
three	indicia	of	religion).	
99	 374	U.S.	398	(1963).
100	Id.	at	404.
101	494	U.S.	872	(1990).
102	42	U.S.C.	§	2000b(b).	
103	521	U.S.	507,	529	(1997).
104	See Stephen	D.	Smith,	The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause, A Reappraisal, 81	Notre Dame L. 
Rev.	1844	(2006)	(arguing	that	competing	views	about	the	government’s	regulatory	role	in	safe-
guarding	religious	freedom	are	emerging	that	advance	the	position	that	the	Establishment	Clause	
only	meant	to	restrict	federal	endorsement	of	state	religion	—	not	all	governmental	endorsement).
105	Bowen	v.	Roy,	476	U.S.	693,	699	(1986).	
106	563	F.3d	127	(5th	Cir.	2009).
107	Id.	at	135.
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sion	between	the	religion	clauses	surfaces	in	the	federal	government’s	
institutional	law-making	capacity.108	Should	Congress	fully	accommo-
date	religious	organizations	as	a	constitutional	right	or	should	it	protect	
religious	organizations	as	a	discretionary	matter,	if	at	all?109	Religious	
exemption	critics	have	argued	 that	 they	are	unwise	policy	choices.110	
This	 essay	 does	 not	 take	 a	 position	 on	 religious	 exemptions	 per se;	
rather,	it	seeks	to	examine	its	meaning	within	the	ENDA	for	LGBT	peo-
ple	and	other	justice-seeking	groups.	The	religious	exemption	issue	is	
of	interest	because	it	emphasizes	the	deep	tension	living	between	the	
religion	clauses	and	civil	rights	progress.
B. Reconciling Religious FReedom and lgBT RighTs
Attitudes	toward	LGBT	people	and	rights	have	changed	consider-
ably	from	ENDA’s	inception	in	1994.	Today,	Americans	are	relatively	
divided	on	the	morality	of	same-sex	relationships111	and	LGBT	rights,	
including	 marriage	 and	 open	 military	 service.112	 Opinions,	 however,	
are	 trending	 more	 favorably	 for	 LGBT	 rights,	 despite	 overall	 oppo-
sition.113	 Traditionally,	 Abrahamic	 religions’	 teachings	 reinforce	 that	
homosexuality	 is	 sinful	 but	 within	 the	 United	 States,	 a	 majority	 of	
“mainline”	Protestants	now	believe	 that	homosexuality	 is	 an	accept-
able	way	of	life.114	Certain	denominations	have	even	welcomed	LGBT	
108	See	 Michael	 W.	 McConnell,	 The Problem of Singling Out Religion,	 50	 DePaul L. Rev.	 1	 (2001)	
(explaining	 that	 the	government’s	rights	arbiter	role	poses	difficulty	when	 it	 is	 responsible	 for	
allocating	or	protecting	conflicting	interests).
109	Id.
110	See	 Frederick	 M.	 Gedicks,	 An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious 
Exemptions,	20	U.A.L.R.	L.	J.	555	(1998);	Angela	C.	Carmella,	Responsible Freedom Under the Religion 
Clauses: Exemptions, Legal Pluralism, and the Common Good,	110	W. Va. L. Rev.	403	(2008).	But see	
Laura	S.	Underkuffler,	Religious Exemptions and the Common Good: A Reply to Professor Carmella,	110	
W. Va. L. Rev. 449	(2008).	See also	Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Religious 
Freedom and the Constitution (2007)	(arguing	against	religious	exemptions	because	they	are	
unfair	to	non-religious	people).
111	See	 Gallup Organization,	Americans Evenly Divided on Morality of Homosexuality	
(2008)	 available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/	 108115/Americans-Evenly-Divided-Morality-
Homosexuality.aspx	 (reporting	 that	 48%	 of	 survey	 participants	 considered	 homosexuality	 to	
be	morally	acceptable	and	48%	of	survey	participants	considered	homosexuality	to	be	morally	
wrong).	
112	See	 Gallup Organization,	 Majority of Americans Continue to Oppose Same-Sex 
Marriage	(2009),	available at http://www.gallup.com/	poll/118378/majority-americans-contin-
ue-oppose-gay-marriage.aspx	(reporting	that	a	slight	majority	—	57%	—	of	survey	participants	
opposed	same-sex	marriage	and	40%	support	same-sex	marriage;	support	for	same-sex	marriage	
is	“significantly”	higher	than	in	1996;	sixty-nine	percent	of	survey	participants	support	open	les-
bian	and	gay	military	service).
113	See id. (reporting	that	sixty-seven	percent	of	survey	participants	support	hate	crimes	coverage	
for	LGBT	people;	sixty-seven	percent	support	domestic	partner	healthcare	coverage;	and	seventy-
three	percent	support	partner	inheritance	rights).
114	See	The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life,	Most Mainline Protestants Say Society 
Should Accept Homosexuality	 (2009),	 available at http://pewforum.org/Gay-Marriage-and-
Homosexuality/Most-Mainline-Protestants-Say-Society-Should-Accept-Homosexuality.aspx	 (re-
porting	that	56%	of	survey	participants	believed	that	homosexuality	should	be	accepted).
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people,	 such	 as	 the	 Presbyterian	 Church,115	 the	 Anglican	 Church,116	
the	United	Church	of	Christ,117	and	Reform	Judaism.118	The	American	
Reconstructionist	 and	 Conservative	 Judaism	 faiths	 permit	 gay	 and	
lesbian	rabbis	as	well	as	same-sex	marriage.119	LGBT	people	are	gain-
ing	greater	acceptance	at	 the	same	time	as	 their	political	movements	
grow.120
America,	nevertheless,	 remains	one	of	 the	most	 religious	nations	
in	the	world.121	Americans	attend	religious	worship	services	and	con-
template	religious	questions	at	a	higher	rate	than	other	industrialized	
nations.122	While	America	is	a	decisively	Christian	nation,	it	is	among	
the	most	religiously	diverse	countries	in	the	world	as	well.123	The	inevi-
tability	of	pluralistic	divisions	around	LGBT	protections	and	religious	
freedom	is	clear	when	considering	that	the	United	States	is	among	the	
most	deeply-religious,	religiously	diverse,	and	openly-gay	populated	
nations	worldwide.124
It	is	important	to	first	contextualize	the	tension	between	civil	rights	
and	religious	freedom	as	an	historic	one.	LGBT	people	are	not	the	first	
115	See	Human	Rights	Campaign,	Stances	of	Faiths	on	LGBT	Issues:	Presbyterian	Church	(USA),	
available at http://www.hrc.org/issues/	religion/5021.htm.	
116	See	Human	Rights	Campaign,	Stances	of	Faiths	on	LGBT	Issues:	Episcopal	Church,	available at 
http://www.hrc.org/issues/religion/	4990.htm.	
117	See	Human	Rights	Campaign,	Stances	of	Faiths	on	LGBT	Issues:	United	Church	of	Christ,	avail-
able at http://www.hrc.org/issues/religion/	5055.htm.	
118	See	Employment Non-Discrimination Act Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Education and Labor,	111th	
Cong.	(2009)	(statement	of	Rabbi	David	Saperstein)	available at http://edlabor.house.gov/docu-
ments/111/pdf/testimony/	20090923DavidSapersteinTestimony.pdf	(“Our	belief	in	ENDA’s	im-
portance	stems	from	a	core	teaching	shared	by	an	array	of	faith	traditions,	Jewish	and	non-Jewish	
alike.	In	the	words	of	Genesis	(1:27)	‘And	God	created	humans	in	God’s	own	image,	in	the	image	
of	God,	God	created	them;	male	and	female	God	created	them.’	We	oppose	discrimination	against	
all	individuals,	including	gay,	lesbian,	bisexual,	and	transgender	men	and	women,	for	the	stamp	
of	the	divine	is	imprinted	on	the	souls	of	each	and	every	one	of	us.”).
119	See Alan	Cooperman,	Conservative Rabbis Allow Ordained Gays, Same-Sex Unions,	Wash. Post,	Dec.	
7,	 2006,	 available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/06/	
AR2006120601247.html	(explaining	that	conservative	rabbis	fell	short	of	endorsing	same-sex	mar-
riage	and	homosexuality	generally,	but	allowed	for	discretion	when	ordaining	homosexual	rabbis	
and	performing	same-sex	commitment	ceremonies).	
120	Perhaps	the	most	visibly	successful	gay	rights	political	movement	is	the	gay	marriage	move-
ment.	Ironically	one	of	the	clear	signs	of	its	building	strength	was	its	backlash	to	it	by	some	seg-
ments	of	the	population.	See Gilbert	Herdt,	Gay Marriage: The Panic and the Right in	Moral panics, 
sex panics: fear and fight over sexual rights	157–193	(2009)	(describing	President’s	Bush	re-
election	on	an	anti-gay	marriage	campaign	and	recent	history	in	gay	rights	movement’s	growth	
and	evolution	that	led	to	that	particular	political	moment).
121	See	Diane	Swanbrow,	U.S. one of the most religious countries,	Univ. of Mich. News Service,	Nov.	
24,	2003,	available at http://www.ur.umich.edu/	0304/Nov24_03/15.shtml	(reporting	on	a	world-
wide	study	conducted	by	the	university,	one	of	the	leading	polling	universities	in	the	world).
122	Id.
123	See	Diana	Eck,	A New Religious America: How a “Christian Country” Has Become the 
World’s Most Religious Diverse Nation	(2001).
124	See	The Williams Institute,	Same-sex Couples and the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual Population: 
New Estimates from the American Community Survey	 (2006),	available at http://www.law.
ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/	 publications/SameSexCouplesandGLBpopACS.pdf	 (reporting	 that	
there	are	at	least	8.8	million	lesbian	and	gay	people	in	the	United	States).
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group	 to	 experience	 religiously-justified	 discrimination.	 Religiosity	
placed	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 slavery’s	 continuation	 and	 resistance	 for	
black	descendents.125	Southern	whites,	in	particular,	relied	on	Biblical	
support	 to	oppose	slave	emancipation.126	Religious	LGBT	civil	 rights	
opposition	is	a	distinctively	unique	position	but	it	resonates	with	his-
torical	 legacies	 in	 which	 some	 segments’	 religious	 attitudes	 lagged	
behind	civil	rights	advancement.127	This	history	also	demonstrates	that	
not	 every	 socio-political	 ethical	 belief	 is	 an	 enduring	 religious	 belief	
that	is	preserved	over	time.
Courts	also	have	served	as	a	barrier	to	LGBT	civil	rights,	especially	
in	terms	of	employment	protection.	ENDA	is	necessary	because	federal	
courts	have	refused	to	extend	sex-based	Title	VII	protections	to	lesbian,	
gay,	and	transgender	people.128	In	the	seminal	case,	DeSantis v. Pacific 
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,129	 three	 gay	 males	 who	 each	 experienced	
workplace	discrimination	had	their	Title	VII	petitions	rejected	by	the	
Equal	 Employment	 Opportunity	 Commission,	 federal	 district	 court,	
and	Ninth	Circuit,	on	the	basis	that	the	court	lacked	jurisdiction.130	The	
Circuit	Court’s	rationale	was	that	Congress	only	intended	to	incorpo-
rate	“traditional	notions”	of	sex	under	the	Title	VII	prohibition.131
More	 recent	 court	 decisions	 have	 affirmed	 this	 interpretation,	
even	though	other	decisions	have	departed	from	the	Court’s	holding	
125	See generally	 Religion and Slavery	 (Paul	 Finkelman	 ed.)	 (1989)	 (highlighting	 the	 vigorous	
religious	debate	over	slavery	in	early	America).	
126	See Rev. W.S. Brown, Preface to the Fifth Edition of Rev. Josiah Priest,	Bible Defense of 
Slavery; ororandor Origin Fortunes, and, History of the Negro Race, at	vi	(1852–1853)	(“Is	
it	not	time,	then,	that	the	South	should	begin	to	defend	herself	against	the	aggressions	of	these	
time-serving	votaries	of	error	and	fanaticism,	and	show	to	the	world	that	her	peculiar	policy	and	
institutions	are	 in	harmony	with	the	genius	of	republicanism,	and	the	spirit	of	Christianity??!?	
Believing	that	such	is	her	true	policy,	and	that	this	proposition	is	much	more	consistent	and	rea-
sonable,	as	well	as	more	easily	established	than	its	converse,	we	have	been	induced	to	give	public-
ity	to	the	following	pages	in	vindication	of	Southern	rights	and	institutions.”).	
127	Religion	and	sexual	identities	have	a	complex	relationship	in	which	America	has	witnessed	a	
reversal	in	the	primacy	of	these	identities	from	the	previous	century	where	religion	was	once	the	
strongest	 identity	 that	 is	now	replaced	by	sexual	and	other	 identities.	See	William	N.	Eskridge	
Jr.,	A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality 
in American Public Law,	106	Yale L.J.	2411,	2412	(1997)	(“In	this	century,	in	fact,	sexual	orientation	
has	steadily	been	replacing	religion	as	the	identity	characteristic	that	is	both	physically	invisible	
and	morally	polarizing.	In	1900,	one’s	group	identity	was	largely	defined	by	one’s	ethnicity,	social	
class,	sex,	and	religion	.	 .	 .	 .	In	2000,	one’s	group	identity	will	be	largely	defined	by	one’s	race,	
income,	sex,	and	sexual	orientation”).	But see id.	at	2412	(“America	has	internalized	the	idea	of	
benign	religious	variation,	that	there	are	a	number	of	equally	good	religions,	and	one’s	religion	
says	little	or	nothing	about	one’s	moral	or	personal	worth.	The	opposite	is	true	of	sexual	orienta-
tion	.	.	 .	 .	Most	Americans	reject	the	idea	of	benign	sexual	variation,	that	there	are	a	number	of	
equally	good	sexual	orientations,	and	that	one’s	sexuality	says	little	or	nothing	about	one’s	moral	
or	personal	worth.”).	(citations	omitted).
128	See	Why DOMA and Not ENDA? A Review of Recent Federal Hostility to Expand Employment Rights 
and Protection Beyond Traditional Notions	(Note),	15	Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J.	177,	181	(1998)	(citing	
examples	of	federal	cases	where	the	courts	have	refused	to	apply	Title	VII	protections).
129	DeSantis	v.	Pacific	Telephone	&	Telegraph	Co.,	608	F.2d	327	(9th	Cir.	1979).
130	See supra	note	128,	at	181.
131	608	F.2d	327,	392	(9th	Cir.	1979).
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in	 DeSantis.132	 The	 jurisprudence	 remains	 significantly	 uneven	 as	 to	
whether	Title	VII’s	“sex”	protections	are	applicable	to	lesbians	and	gays.	
Similarly,	transgender	and	gender	non-conforming	people	also	main-
tain	asymmetrical	protection,	depending	on	a	variety	of	factors.	These	
include	plaintiff’s	gender	identity	and	expression,	whether	the	plaintiff	
plans	to	transition	genders,	and	other	peculiarly	conditional	factors.133	
Title	VII’s	legislative	history	has	prevented	LGBT	people	from	claim-
ing	federal	statutory	protection	against	employment	discrimination,134	
which	strengthens	the	urgency	for	which	ENDA	is	being	advocated	by	
LGBT	advocates	and	lawmakers.
Scholars	have	weighed	in	on	the	inherent	tension	between	religious	
freedom	and	civil	rights,	particularly	for	LGBT	people.135	Professor	Chai	
Feldblum,	a	prominent	voice	on	LGBT	policy	and	morality,	 explains	
that	liberal	political	theory	locates	proper	governmental	action	in	the	
safeguarding	individuals’	rights	to	pursue	their	conception	of	a	“good”	
moral	 life,	rather	than	endorsing	a	specific	normative	moral	position	
on	the	“good”	life.136	She	goes	on	to	argue	that	there	must	be	“some-
thing	 more”	 than	 a	 law’s	 moral	 assessment	 to	 illegitimately	 burden	
individuals’	“belief	liberty.”137	Failure	to	acknowledge	that	laws	carry	
132	See Smith	v.	City	of	Salem,	Ohio,	378	F.3d	566	(6th	Cir.	2004)	(rehearing	en banc	denied)	(Oct.	18,	
2004)	(holding	that	employee’s	allegations	of	discrimination	based	upon	gender	non-conforming	
behavior	were	actionable	under	Title	VII);	Nichols	v.	Azteca	Restaurant	Enterprises,	Inc.,	256	F.3d	
864	(9th	Cir.	2001)	(holding	employer	liable	for	harassment	of	former	homosexual	employee).	
133	See Katie	 Koch	 &	 Richard	 Bales,	 Transgender Employment Non-Discrimination,	 17	 U.C.L.A. 
Women’s L.J.	243,	250–62	(2008)	(arguing	that	transgender	should	be	included	in	the	definition	of	
“sex”	like	pregnancy	is	and	citing	state	court	examples	of	such	construction).	
134	See supra note	128,	at	186	(citing	federal	court	holding	that	Title	VII	does	not	protect	employees	
from	sexual	orientation	discrimination).
135	See, e.g.,	Martha	Minow,	Should Religious Groups Be Exempt From Civil Rights Laws?,	48	B.C.	L.	
Rev.	781,	786	(2007)	(civil	rights	protect	both	religious	rights	and	sexual	rights	which	may	be	in	
conflict);	Chai	R.	Feldblum,	Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion,	72	Brook. L. Rev.	
61,	63	(2006)	(advocates	of	non-discrimination	support	equality	whereas	the	other	may	seek	reli-
gious	freedom);	Josiah	N.	Drew,	Caught Between the Scylla and Charybdis: Ameliorating the Collision 
Course of Sexual Orientation Anti-discrimination Rights and Religious Free Exercise Rights in the Public 
Workplace,	16	B.Y.U.	J.	Pub.	L.	287,	300	(2002);	(“gay	rights	advocates	should	turn	toward,	rather	
than	away	from	religion”);	Jack	M.	Battaglia,	supra note	53. 
136	See	Chai	Feldblum,	 supra note	135,	 at	 84	 (“major	 liberal	political	 theory	postulates	 that	mo-
rality	 is	not	the	proper	objective	of	government	action”).	Commentators	have	also	argued	that	
the	normative	value	of	governmental	neutrality	is	challenged	when	individuals	invoke	religious	
exemptions	for	idiosyncratic	religious	beliefs	or	practices.	See Religious Exemptions and the Limits 
of Neutrality	(Note)	74	Tex. L. Rev. 120	(1996)	(“It	is	tempting	to	think	that	neutrality	forbids	the	
government	from	making	any	normative	judgments	when	religion	is	at	issue.	If	we	indulge	this	
temptation,	we	will	be	inclined	to	insist	that	courts	disregard	the	extent	to	which	a	party	seek-
ing	a	mandatory	exemption	on	religious	grounds	embraces	beliefs	or	values	 that	deviate	 from	
familiar	religious	beliefs	or	values.	But	the	notion	of	neutrality	cannot	possibly	relieve	us	of	the	
task	of	bringing	normative	concerns	to	bear	on	the	views	of	those	who	seek	mandatory	religion	
exemptions.”).
137	Id.	at	89–122.	
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moral	assessments	and	alienate	some	members	of	society’s	beliefs,	she	
argues,	is	intellectually	dishonest,	and	ignores	reality.138
Feldblum’s	 analysis	 leads	 to	 other	 scholars’	 religious	 exemption	
critiques.	 As	 a	 backdrop	 to	 these	 critiques,	 Louis	 Fisher	 observes,	
“[w]hile	constitutional	limits	apply	to	the	creation	of	statutory	protec-
tions	 for	 religious	 purposes,	 the	 courts	 have	 not	 invalidated	 any	 of	
the	special	exemptions	adopted	by	Congress.”139	Fisher	contends	that	
the	responsibility	for	safeguarding	religious	freedom	is	shared	among	
courts,	governmental	institutions,	and	political	forces	that	apply	pres-
sure	to	government.140	The	Constitution’s	high	value	on	civil	rights	and	
religious	 freedom	 produces	 high	 stakes	 for	 policy	 choices	 that	 must	
express	a	moral	preference one	way	or	the	other.141
Conversely,	some	commentators	have	pointed	out	that	LGBT	non-
discrimination	 laws	 and	 religious	 freedom	 protections	 seek	 similar	
goals:	to	exercise	a	negative	right	to	free	expression,	and	to	invoke	posi-
tive	right	against	infringement.142	Professor	William	Eskridge,	for	this	
reason,	 advances	 a	 comparative-need	 accommodation	 approach	 that	
allows	parties	to	mediate	their	differences	toward	a	mutually	benefi-
cial	resolution.143	This	approach,	in	other	words,	seeks	to	ascertain	the	
core	needs	of	conflicting	parties	and	to	accommodate	these	identified	
needs.	This	approach	is	useful	because	it	moves	away	from	the	dichot-
omous	framework	placed	around	these	interests,	although	it	is	unclear	
how	 this	 approach	 can	 be	 institutionalized	 within	 federal	 statutory	
regulation.
Importantly,	there	still	remain	divergent	views	about	how	to	recon-
cile	LGBT	civil	rights	and	religious	freedom	interests.	Most	commenta-
tor	suggestions,	however,	fall	into	three	categories:	1)	the	preservation	
or	elimination	of	religious	exemptions	or	adjustment	of	their	scope;	2)	
mediation	 as	 a	 methodological	 remedy;	 and	 3)	 alternative,	 non-reli-
gious	accommodations.	The	following	section	of	this	comment	will	fur-
ther	evaluate	this	tension	within	the	area	of	employment.
138	Id. at	89.	Professor	Feldblum	also	criticizes	gay	rights	leaders	for	claiming	that	LGBT	civil	rights	
laws	are	morally	neutral.	See	Chai	Feldblum,	Moral Rhetoric of Legislation,	72	N.Y.U. L.	Rev.	992,	996	
(1997).
139	Louis	Fisher,	Statutory	Exemptions	for	Religious	Freedom,	44	J. Church & St. 291	(2002).
140	Id.	
141	See Laura	 K.	 Klein,	 Rights Clash: How Conflicts Between Gays Rights and Religious Freedoms 
Challenge the Legal System,	98	Geo. L.J.	505,	514–18	(2010)	(framing	the	religious	exemption	debate	
for	LGBT	rights	as	which	side	should	be	accommodated	most	of	the	time	as	most	scholars	agree	
that	a	narrow	exception	should	exist).
142	See, e.g., supra	note	127,	at	2430.	(“state	should	be	encouraged	to	prohibit	private	censorship	or	
discrimination	on	the	basis	of	religion	or	sexual	orientation.”).	
143	Id.	at	2449–54.
73749_AU_LPB.indd   77 12/20/10   8:34 AM
78	 Religious Exemption or Exceptionalism?
C. The Issue of RelIgIous exempTIon nexus: DIsseCTIng The 
CompellIng InTeResT foR RelIgIous exempTIon unDeR enDA
Many	scholarly	debates	on	LGBT	civil	rights	and	religious	freedom	
address	the	issue	of	same-sex	marriage.144	The	issue	of	employment,	in	
contrast,	only	tangentially	implicates	faith-based	beliefs.	The	relevance	
of	religious	freedom	arguments	is	diminished	when	the	civil	rights	in	
question	indirectly	relate	to	religion	because	the	attenuation	between	
religious	belief	and	infringement	is	remote.	The	scope	of	religious	free-
dom	is	broad	but	not	unconstrained.145	The	Supreme	Court	has	consis-
tently	held	that	when	the	federal	government	creates	a	neutral	law	that	
incidentally	burdens	the	free	exercise	of	a	particular	religious	practice	
or	belief,	it	does	not	infringe	on	an	individual’s	free	religious	exercise.	
146	Chai	Feldblum’s	“belief	 liberty”	 theory	 is	 central	 to	an	accommo-
dationist	 analysis	 that	 seeks	 to	 balance	 state	 religious	 endorsement,	
religious	 freedom,	 and	 non-discrimination	 rights,	 specifically	 when	
addressing	employment	non-discrimination	for	LGBT	people.
Most	 Americans	 believe	 that	 LGBT	 people	 face	 “a	 lot”	 of	
discrimination,147	 more	 in	 fact,	 than	 any	 other	 group.148	 A	 majority	
of	 religiously-identified	 people	 subscribes	 to	 this	 belief	 as	 well.149	 A	
poll	on	 transgender	discrimination	reported	 that	37%	of	 transgender	
survey	 participants	 felt	 as	 if	 they	 had	 experienced	 discrimination.150	
Consequently,	 most	 Americans	 oppose	 employment	 discrimination	
against	lesbians	and	gays,	and	a	comparable	percentage	of	people	sup-
port	protections	for	transgender	people.151	Apart	from	morally-charged	
questions	related	 to	marriage,	most	people	 feel	as	 if	LGBT	 individu-
als	ought	to	have	the	right	to	work	free	of	discrimination.	These	data	
strongly	 suggest	 that	 opposition	 to	 LGBT	 workplace	 discrimination	
protection	 is	 not	 religiously	 based,	 but	 instead	 based	 upon	 ethically	
informed	political	beliefs.
144	See, e.g.,	Martha	Minow,	supra note	135;	Chai	Feldblum,	supra note	135;	Koppelman,	infra note	
161.	
145	See supra	notes	105-107.	
146	See Church	 of	 the	 Lukumi	 Babalu	 Aye,	 Inc.	 v.	 City	 of	 Hialeah,	 508	 U.S.	 520,	 531	 (1993);	
Employment	Div.,	494	U.S.	at	879	(if	a	law	is	neutral	and	generally	applicable,	but	incidentally	
affects	religion,	it	need	not	satisfy	a	compelling	state	interest	to	survive	constitutional	scrutiny).	
147	See	 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life & The Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press, Most Still Oppose Same Sex Marriage,	 Majority Continue to 
Support Civil Unions	8	(2009)	(64%)	available at http://pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Topics/
Issues/Gay_	Marriage_and_Homosexuality/samesexmarriage09.pdf.
148	Id.	
149	Id.
150	See	 Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force Action Fund, Passing the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act: A Toolkit	 5	 (2009)	 available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/enda07/
ENDAtoolkit_c4.pdf.
151	Id.	at	7	(reporting	that	61%	of	Americans	support	transgender	employment	non-discrimination	
laws).
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ENDA	 seeks	 to	 provide	 such	 protection	 against	 widespread	
anti-LGBT	discrimination.	 Its	purpose	 is	 to	“address	 the	history	and	
widespread	pattern	of	irrational	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	sexual	
orientation	or	gender	 identity	by	private	sector	employers	and	local,	
State,	and	Federal	government	employers.”152	Similarly,	Title	VII	of	the	
Civil	Rights	Act	was	enacted	to	make	illegal	employment	practices	that	
“fail	or	refuse	to	hire	or	to	discharge	any	individual,	or	otherwise	to	
discriminate	against	any	individual	with	respect	to	his	compensation,	
terms,	conditions,	or	privileges	of	employment	because	of	such	indi-
vidual’s	race,	color,	religion,	sex,	or	national	origin	.	.	.	.”153	The	goal	to	
eliminate	employment	discrimination	does	not	in	itself	offend	religious	
views.	It	may	offend	privacy	interests	of	those	who	are	uncomfortable	
with	LGBT	people,	yet	privacy	interests	are	not	synonymous	to	religi-
osity,	particularly	within	a	constitutional	context.	
It	is,	after	all,	neither	possible	nor	desirable	to	accommodate	ethi-
cal	beliefs	—	rational	or	not	—	that	LGBT	people	simply	should	not	
exist.	Some	ENDA	opponents	may	characterize	their	objection	to	LGBT	
romantic	orientation	toward	members	of	the	same	gender	or	orienta-
tion	toward	a	particular	gender	identity	or	expression.	In	other	words,	
it	is	the	romantic	act	or	gender	presentation	that	is	believed	to	be	sin-
ful.154	 Be	 that	 as	 it	 may,	 an	 ethical	 commitment	 to	 opposite	 sex	 love	
or	gender	conformity	is	not	necessarily	a	religious	belief.	In	most	reli-
gious	freedom	cases,	courts	shy	away	from	dissecting	the	veracity	of	a	
religious	claim,155	but	in	some	cases	where	the	civil	rights	interests	are	
especially	strong,	it	is	reasonable	to	further	inquire	to	the	nature	of	the	
belief.
Some	scholars	take	purported	religious	beliefs	against	employment	
protection	for	granted.	Andrew	Koppelman,	in	his	well-known	article,	
You Can’t Hurry: Love	Why Anti-Discrimination Protections for Gay People 
Should Have Religious Exemptions,	 argues	 for	 religious	 exemptions	 of	
LGBT	civil	rights	laws	based	on	the	rationale	that	“forced	association	
with	gay	people”	will	amount	 to	a	 tangible	harm	and	prevent	 those	
who	oppose	homosexuality	from	living	honestly	with	their	values.156
This	 line	of	 reasoning	borders	on	absurdity	 for	 two	primary	rea-
sons:	 First,	 it	 entirely	 ignores	 historical	 discrimination	 against	 other	
152	H.R.	2981,	111th	Cong.	§	2(1)	(1st	Sess.	2009)	available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
billtext.xpd?bill=h111-2981.
153	42	U.S.C.	§	2000e-2(1)	
154	See, e.g.,	Americans	for	Truth	About	Homosexuality,	Tell	Congress	You	Oppose	ENDA	—	The	
‘ENDA’	 Our	 Freedom’	 Bill,	 available at http://americansfortruth.com/news/tell-congress-you-
oppose-enda-the-enda-our-freedom-bill.html	(eliciting	opposition	to	ENDA	on	the	basis	that	the	
gay	agenda	is	attempting	to	pass	an	oppressive	law	that	threaten	to	silence	religious	freedom	to	
voice	the	self-evident	truth	that	homosexuality	is	sinful).	
155	See Lemon	v.	Kurtzman,	403	U.S.	602	(1971).
156	Andrew	Koppelman,	You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections For Gay People 
Should Have Religious Exemptions,	72	Brook. L. Rev.	125,	135	(2007).
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groups	 currently	 protected	 under	 employment	 non-discrimination	
laws.	Indeed,	“forced	association”	with	blacks	likely	posed	discomfort	
to	some	Whites	who	held	racial	animus	towards	blacks.	Some	whites,	
in	fact,	had	to	learn	to	coexist	with	Blacks	as	equals,	which	required	a	
level	of	uneasy	“dishonesty”	 for	a	 time.	Yet	 forced	association	alone	
does	 not	 sanction	 mistreatment	 as	 precluded	 by	 non-discrimination	
laws.	Uncomfortable	co-existence	is	sometimes	a	fact	of	life	that	privi-
leged	groups	must	endure	for	the	sake	of	progress,	for	which	conserva-
tive	Christians	and	other	religious	people	are	no	exception.
Second,	 Koppelman	 treats	 employment	 discrimination	 and	 dis-
comfort	 arising	 from	 forced	 association	 as	 comparable	 when	 these	
experiences	are	clearly	not	similar.	Such	a	position	is	hard	to	take	seri-
ously	 as	 joblessness	 leads	 to	 endemic	 poverty	 among	 lesbians	 and	
gays,	particularly	transgender	people.157	Further,	persistent	discrimina-
tion	experienced	by	LGBT	routinely	leads	to	mental	health	illness	and	
suicide.158	Merely	disliking	your	co-workers	based	on	divergent	ethical	
views	is	hardly	a	basis	to	justify	broad	religious	organization	exemp-
tions.	Koppelman’s	foundational	argument	reveals	a	libertarian	prefer-
ence	for	not	working	with	LGBT	people	that	is	a	far	cry	from	religious	
orthodoxy.
An	 overbroad	 religious	 exemption	 in	 ENDA	 potentially	 under-
mines	 the	 law’s	 goal	 to	 eradicate	 discrimination.	 The	 absence	 of	 a	
bona	fide	occupational	qualification	—	a	narrow	Title	VII	defense	that	
allows	employers	to	justify	its	discrimination	under	statute	—	invites	
employers	 to	discriminate	 for	any	religious	reason.159	The	broad	reli-
gious	exemption	in	earlier	versions	of	ENDA	sends	a	mixed	message	
to	the	courts	by	asking	“if	Congress	really	intended	to	stamp	out	sexual	
orientation	discrimination,	why	are	religious	groups	above	it?”160	The	
most	recent	ENDA	version	does	not	appear	to	contain	a	BFOQ	defense	
under	Title	VII’s	703(e)(1).161	Therefore,	ENDA’s	previously	broad	reli-
gious	 exemption	 was	 equivalent	 to	 a	 generous	 BFOQ	 defense162	 that	
buffered	 the	employment	 sector	most	 likely	 to	 justify	discrimination	
157	See supra	note	130.	
158	See Kristen	K.	Clements-Nolle,	Rani	Marx	&	Mitchell	Katz,	Attempted Suicide Among Transgender 
Persons: The Influence of Gender-Based Discrimination and Victimization,	gender-based discrimination 
and victimization,	J. Homosexuality 53, 53-69 (2006) (presenting	research	to	illustrate	increases	in	
mental	illness	due	to	discrimination	and	victimization).
159	See J.	Banning	Jasiunas,	Is ENDA the Answer? Can a “Separate But Equal” Federal Statute Adequately 
Protect Gays and Lesbians from Employment Discrimination?	61	Ohio St. L.J.	1529,	1553	(2000);	Jack	
M.	Battaglia,	supra note	53,	at	227-28.
160	Id.	
161	42	U.S.C.	§	2000e-2(a)(e)(1).
162	See Kate	 B.	 Rhodes,	 Defending ENDA: The Ramifications of Omitting the BFOQ Defense in the 
Employment in the Employment Non-Discrimination Act,	19	Law & Sexuality	1,	29	(2010)	(“The	most	
puzzling	aspect	of	ENDA’s	lack	of	a	BFOQ	defense	is	the	absence	of	any	real	debate	or	concerns	
about	its	inclusion	or	exclusion.	The	BFOQ	defense	has	been	a	vital	part	of	Title	VII,	and	is	often,	
but	unsuccessfully,	asserted	as	an	affirmative	defense.	Including	a	BFOQ	defense	would	enable	
ENDA	to	mirror	more	closely	Title	VII,	which	floor	debates	have	 indicated	 to	be	 the	 intent	of	
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against	LGBT	people	against	the	law’s	application,	and	validated	the	
untenable	view	 that	all	 religious	organizations	maintain	a	 legitimate	
interest	in	LGBT	discrimination.
ENDA	 opponents	 have	 been	 unable	 to	 articulate	 a	 reasonable	
nexus	 between	 religious	 belief	 and	 LGBT	 workplace	 discrimination.	
Upon	 deconstructing	 moral	 claims	 that	 merely	 working	 with	 LGBT	
people	will	offend	deeply	held	religious	beliefs,	it	becomes	clear	that	
such	claims	are	libertarian,	not	religious	claims.	These	proto-religious	
claims	 do	 not	 rise	 to	 the	 level	 of	 substantial	 burden	 that	 may	 occur	
when	the	government	makes	it	religiously	impossible to	exercise	a	belief	
or	practice.163	Impossibility	is	not	the	Free	Exercise	Clause	standard	but	
instead	provides	a	comparative	lens	from	which	to	assess	ethical	dis-
comfort	claims.	Religious	organizations	that	view	homosexual	acts	as	
immoral	or	gender	non-conformity	as	unnatural	do	not	suffer	a	sub-
stantial	 burden	 in	 merely	 having	 openly	 gay	 or	 transgender	 within	
their	professional	environments.
D. The Risk of Religious oRganizaTion exempTion  
oveR-accommoDaTion
ENDA’s	religious	exemptions	prior	to	2009	were	broad	not	only	in	
a	statutory	sense	but	also	 in	more	general	 legal	sense.	These	exemp-
tions	 lacked	 a	 narrowing	 principle,	 such	 as	 Title	 VII’s	 restriction	 on	
religious	 discrimination,	 or	 a	 BFOQ.	 Moreover,	 the	 legislative	 his-
tory	failed	to	demonstrate	a	reasonable	nexus	between	religiosity	and	
employment	discrimination.164	The	exemption’s	overreach	and	lack	of	
nexus	alone	suggest	that	such	an	exemption	would	not	survive	strict	
scrutiny	review.
However,	the	previous	exemptions	also	may	have	violated	the	reli-
gious	clauses.	The	operative	presumption	embedded	into	the	exemp-
tion’s	construction	was	 that	all	 religious	organizations	may	object	 to	
LGBT	moral	choices	to	lead	open	and	honest	lives.	This	presumption	is	
false,	as	discussed	earlier,	because	some	religious	institutions	and	orga-
nizations	 support	 LGBT	 equality.165	 It	 then	 follows	 that	 the	 religious	
exemptions	 sought	 to	accommodate	a	particular	 religious	 sub-group	
Congress.	However,	excluding	a	BFOQ	defense	would	better	effectuate	the	purpose	of	ENDA,	to	
eliminate	sexual	orientation	discrimination	in	employment.”).
163	See Eugene	Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions — A Research Agenda with Test 
Suites,	21	Cardozo L. Rev.	595,	654–55	(2000)	(stating	that	in	some	religious	freedom	cases	that	
objectors	find	themselves	 in	a	quandary	in	which	a	particular	act	 to	be	legally	permissible	but	
religiously	 impermissible;	 this	 impermissibly	however	 is	 closely	 related	 to	a	 sincerely-held	 re-
ligious	belief,	such	as	a	prisoner	maintaining	a	kosher	diet	when	the	prison	does	not	offer	any	
kosher-options).	
164	This	is	my	conclusion	after	primarily	reviewing	the	three	legislative	hearings	on	ENDA	during	
its	fourteen-year	history.	See supra	note	31,	39,	&	79.
165	See supra	notes	115–117.	
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—	conservative	Christians	—	who	aggressively	opposed	the	bill.166	The	
natural	extension	of	this	argument	is	that	the	sweeping	scope	of	prior	
ENDA	versions’	 religious	exemptions	aimed	 to	over-accommodate	a	
particular	religious	sub-group	—	an	accommodation	that	in	is	violation	
of	the	Establishment	Clause.
Recent	Establishment	Clause	jurisprudence	supports	the	view	that	
government	endorsement	may	take	the	form	of	statutory	exceptional-
ism.	Justice	O’Connor’s	refining	of	the	Lemon	test	is	instructive.	If	a	reg-
ulation’s	purpose	conveys	a	message	that	a	particular	religious	belief	
is	 favored	 or	 preferred,	 it	 then	 violates	 the	 Establishment	 Clause.167	
ENDA’s	 previous	 religious	 exemption	 was	 premised	 on	 a	 particu-
lar	religious	belief,	maintained	by	some	conservative	Christians,	 that	
L.G.B.	sexual	acts	are	immoral.	Its	purpose	was	to	shield	this	religious	
segment’s	organizations	from	ENDA	compliance.	Such	an	accommo-
dation	tips	the	delicate	Establishment	Clause	and	Free	Exercise	balance	
toward	State	religious	endorsement.
This	 perspective	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 other	 statutory	
schemes	 strike	 a	 better	 balance	 between	 accommodation	 and	 civil	
rights.	A	broad	ministerial	exception	is	a	reasonable	approach,	similar	
to	the	one	within	the	2009	version	of	ENDA	or	the	District	of	Columbia’s	
same-sex	 marriage	 law.	 Congress’	 policy	 choice	 against	 a	 narrower	
exemption	 is	an	affirmative	entanglement	with	a	particular	 religious	
belief.	Whether	such	a	belief	is	deeply	held	is	irrelevant	in	this	context.	
A	favorable	expression	of	a	religious	belief	satisfies	O’Connor’s	Lemon	
“endorsement”	test.
The	inquiry	then	turns	to	whether	the	religious	exemption	advances	
a	secular	purpose	and	whether	its	endorsement	is	merely	incidental	to	
achieving	its	secular	purpose.168	The	religious	exemption,	by	definition,	
does	not	serve	a	secular	purpose.	Courts	have	explained	that	lawmak-
ers	must	exercise	great	caution	in	carving	religious	exemptions	in	neu-
tral	statutes	because	“such	exemptions	could	become	first	steps	toward	
advancing	religion	or	could	entangle	Government	in	repeated	religious	
inquiries,	 results	 proscribed	 by	 establishment	 clause.”169	 In	 ENDA’s	
case,	 it	 is	 the	 breadth	 and	 context	 of	 the	 religious	 exemption	 that	
advances	a	particular	religious	view,	though	the	2007	version	sought	
166	A	 well-known	 conservative	 Christian	 advocacy	 group,	 Focus	 on	 the	 Family,	 is	 one	 among	
many	evangelical	organizations	 that	have	publicly	expressed	 its	virulent	opposition	 to	ENDA.	
See	 Focus	 on	 the	 Family,	 Letter	 to	 Congress,	 Sept.	 2,	 2009,	 available at http://fota.cdnetworks.
net/pdfs/2009-09-02-enda-letter.pdf	(arguing	that	the	religious	liberty	threat	posed	by	ENDA	is	a	
“litigation	minefield”).	
167	See supra	note	76.	
168	See	American	Civil	Liberties	Union	of	Kentucky	v.	Grayson	County,	Ky.,	591	F.3d	837,	845	(6th	
Cir.	2010);	Newdow	v.	Rio	Linda	Union	School	Dist.,	597	F.3d	1007,	1076	(9th	Cir.	2010);	Freedom	
From	Religion	Found.	Inc.	v.	Obama,	WL	1499451	at	13	(W.D.	Wis.	2010).	
169	See	Abdool-Rashaad	v.	Seiter, 690	F.Supp.	598,	601	(S.D.	Ohio	1987).
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to	 guard	 against	 religious	 inquiries	 prohibited	 by	 the	 Establishment	
Clause	with	its	judicial	review	provision.170
ENDA’s	over	accommodation	of	an	arguable	 religious	viewpoint	
violates	the	Establishment	Clause.	Critics	may	make	two	points.	First,	
critics	may	raise	the	point	that	the	exemption	cannot	endorse	any	reli-
gious	 viewpoint	 because	 it	 is	 a	 virtual	 blanket	 exemption.	 This	 fact	
is	 accurate	 at	 first-blush.	 However,	 based	 on	 the	 legislative	 history	
and	public	advocacy	positions	of	extreme	Christian	conservatives,	an	
informed observer	 can	 easily	 read	 the	 exemption’s	 purpose.	 Second,	
critics	may	argue	that	an	exemption	logically	cannot	advance	a	view-
point	because	it	 is	a	negative	action.	On	the	contrary,	a	policy	choice	
to	grant	an	exemption	within	a	generally	applicable	neutral	law	is	an	
affirmative	act	that	benefited	a	small	but	growing	Christian	organiza-
tional	community,	at	 the	very	 least.	 It	 is	 further	argued	that	ENDA’s	
religious	immunization	expressed	a	preference	among	the	many	reli-
giously	informed,	ethical	views	that	exist	on	homosexuality	and	asso-
ciation	 that	 amounts	 to	 a	 government	 endorsement.	 Regardless	 of	
Congress’s	attempt	to	make	the	previous	exemptions	seem	as	though	
they	were	neutral,	it	is	unlikely	that	such	treatment	of	certain	religious	
organizations	would	survive	strict	scrutiny	because	it	is	a	thinly	veiled	
accommodation	to	religious	organizations	that	would	simply	prefer	to	
pretend	that	LGBT	people	do	not	exist.
Other	 scholars	 have	 suggested	 alternatives	 to	 statutory	 religious	
exemptions.	One	suggestion	centers	on	the	power	of	meditation	to	cure	
employment	 conflicts.	 Jennifer	 Brown	 argues	 that	 meditation	 holds	
“great	promise”	for	resolving	gay	rights	and	religious	liberty	disputes	
because	it	allows	parties	to	extract	the	fundamentality	of	the	tension.171	
Plus,	she	observes	that	mediation	can	dovetail	differences	rather	than	
emphasizing	 them	 because	 “[m]ediation,	 much	 more	 than	 litigation,	
can	deploy	core	values	within	Christian	or	LGBT	experience	to	create	
empathy	and	shared	understanding	between	 the	parties.”172	Another	
approach	suggests	that	some	religious	organizations’	needs	can	be	met	
with	relational	privacy	exemptions.	Similar	exemptions	currently	exist	
for	small	businesses	with	fifteen	or	fewer	employees	under	Title	VII.173	
Ultimately,	ENDA’s	 religious	organizations	exemptions	—	especially	
the	bill’s	older	versions	—	are	political	accommodations	more	so	than	
legal	ones	mandated	under	the	First	Amendment.
The	 primary	 objective	 behind	 examining	 ENDA’s	 previous	 reli-
gious	exemptions	is	to	explain	how	over	accommodation	can	turn	into	
170	See supra	note	59.	
171	See	 Jennifer	Gerarda	Brown,	Peacemaking in the Culture War Between Gay Rights and Religious 
Liberty,	95	Iowa L. Rev.	747	(2010)	(arguing	that	the	culture	war	between	gay	rights	and	religious	
liberty	does	not	need	to	be	a	zero-sum	game).	
172	Id.	at	800.	
173	42	U.S.C.	§	2000e(b).
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religious	 exceptionalism.	 It	 is	 deeply	 troubling	 that	 a	 powerful	 reli-
gious	community	and	political	machine	can	influence	public	policy	in	
a	way	to	insulate	it	entirely	from	civil	rights	laws.	Undoubtedly,	reli-
gious	freedom	ought	to	be	vigorously	protected,	but	such	protections	
should	not	exceed	reasonability	to	accommodate	a	particular	group’s	
relational	preference	at	the	expense	of	LGBT	individuals’	livelihoods.	
Exceptional	 treatment	 of	 this	 kind	 violates	 vital	 First	 Amendment	
principles,	and	it	is,	candidly,	a	poor	policy.	Whether	LGBT	advocates	
expressly	 targeted	ENDA’s	 religious	organization	exemption	or	 law-
makers	tracking	the	political	winds	narrowed	its	scope,	it	is	a	victory	
for	LGBT	individuals	and	other	marginalized	individuals	seeking	civil	
rights	protection.
IV. ChallengIng ConserVatIVes’ entItlement to  
relIgIous exCeptIonalIsm
It	 is	imperative	that	a	balance	is	maintained	between	the	religion	
clauses	 because	 equilibrium	 ensures	 governmental	 fairness	 within	 a	
pluralistic	religious	and	otherwise	diverse	democracy.	The	over	accom-
modation	of	particular	religious	communities	undermines	the	fragile	
balance	between	 religious	 fairness	and	 freedom.	 In	 terms	of	 striking	
this	balance	and	achieving	civil	 rights	progress,	 religious	 favoritism,	
in	 the	 form	of	 religious	exceptionalism,	 is	an	 iniquitous	 setback	 that	
equally	threatens	religious	freedom,	religious	fairness,	and	civil	rights	
advancement.
It	is	unclear	how	broadly	courts	will	read	the	religious	exemption	
in	the	2009	version	of	ENDA	or	its	potential	impact	on	LGBT	people	
who	wish	to	work	in	religious	organizations.	It	can	be	argued	that	the	
narrowing	of	the	exemption	indicates	intent	for	the	law	to	be	consistent	
with	Title	VII’s	limited	scope,	or	alternatively,	that	the	bill’s	long	his-
tory	with	a	broad	exemption	more	clearly	reflects	congressional	intent	
to	treat	LGBT	differently	in	some	way.	One	writer	convincingly	argues	
that	 ENDA’s	 stand-alone	 statutory	 scheme	 in	 itself	 invites	 courts	 to	
treat	 LGBT	 protections	 differently	 from	 other	 Title	 VII	 protections.174	
At	the	same	time,	as	religious	organizations	are	becoming	significant	
economic	 players	 and	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 persons	 come	 out	 of	
the	closet,	the	number	of	affected	persons	from	an	exemption	is	likely	
higher	than	previous	estimates.	Overlooking	this	community	is	detri-
mental	to	ENDA	potency,	and	one	that	deserves	more	attention	from	
LGBT	advocates.
ENDA’s	 legislative	 history	 suggests	 that	 its	 religious	 exemption	
scope	is	closely	aligned	to	the	politics	of	the	day.	Though	politics	inevi-
174	See J.	Banning	Jasiunas,	supra note	159.	
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tably	affect	all	civil	rights	proposals,175	the	way	in	which	conservative	
Christian	political	forces	dictated	ENDA’s	religious	exemption	is	dis-
quieting.	 Two	 observations	 from	 this	 history	 reinforce	 this	 point:	 (1)	
religious	 organizations	 enjoyed	 a	 wholesale	 exemption	 for	 much	 of	
ENDA’s	legislative	life,	and	(2)	discussion	surrounding	the	exemption	
was	often	touted	as	a	positive	aspect	of	the	bill,	even	by	LGBT	advo-
cates.	 Such	 a	 willing	 concession	 by	 lawmakers	 and	 lesbian	 and	 gay	
advocates	demonstrates	the	political	climate	in	which	ENDA	operated	
until	recently.
Conservative	Christians	have	long	dominated	the	political	and	cul-
tural	landscape	over	LGBT	rights.	Coined	as	“special	rights,”	conserva-
tive	Christian	rhetoric	was	adopted	by	mainstream	America,	where	the	
right	from	discrimination	and	harm	was	seen	as	inappropriately	inter-
est	driven.176	Similarly,	 conservative	Christian	political	 forces	 framed	
gay	advocacy	as	an	“agenda”	that	sought	to	impose	a	certain	set	of	val-
ues	on	others.177	The	Religious	Right’s	success	in	dominating	the	land-
scape	forced	LGBT	advocates	to	apologetically	defend	and	qualify	its	
proposals,	as	evidenced	through	enthusiastic	claims	that	ENDA	does	
not	affect	religious	organizations.	As	LGBT	political	capital	increases,	
however,	LGBT	advocates	have	re-fashioned	their	rhetoric	to	argue	that	
LGBT	persons	deserve	workplace	protection	as	a	constitutional	right.178
The	politics	of	accommodation	are	 familiar	 to	both	 the	Religious	
Right	and	LGBT	advocates.	While	the	Religious	Right	has	maintained	
an	exceptionalism	entitlement	under	the	guise	of	religious	freedom,	the	
LGBT	movement	has	wagered	significant	sacrifices	to	achieve	legisla-
tive	success.179	The	narrowing	of	ENDA’s	religious	exemption,	 there-
fore,	 represents	 a	 legislative	 victory	 for	 LGBT	 civil	 rights,	 in	 which	
175	See generally	Charles and Barbara Whalen,	The Longest Debate: A Legislative History 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act	(1985)	(documenting	the	complex	political	maneuvering	involved	
in	passing	the	Civil	Rights	Act	of	1964).	
176	See	Samuel	A.	Marcosson,	The	“Special	Rights”	Canard	in	the	Debate	over	Lesbian	and	Gay	
Rights,	9	Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y	137	(1995). 
177	See Aimee	 D.	 Dayhoff,	 Sodomy	 Laws:	 The	 Government’s	 Vehicle	 to	 Impose	 the	 Majority’s	
Social	Values,	27	Wm. Mitchell L. Rev.	1863	(2001).	See also President	Obama	and	Washington	
D.C.	radicals	plan	to	impose	homosexuality	and	silence	Christianity	in	workplaces.	Will	you	help	
me	warn	Congress,	Family Research Council (Nov.	2009),	available at http://thinkprogress.org/
wp-content/uploads/2009/12/FRC-ENDA-letter.pdf.	More	recently	L.G.B.T	advocates	have	re-
versed	the	rhetoric	to	claim	that	the	Religious	Right	threatens	to	impose	their	“religious	values”	
on	others; Many Americans Uneasy with the Mix of Religion and Politics, Pew	Research	
Center	for	the	People	&	The	Press	Aug.	24,	(2006),	available at http://pewforum.org/uploaded-
files/Topics/Issues/Politics_and_Elections/religion-politics-06.pdf	 (reporting	 that	 49%	 of	 sur-
vey	 participants	 believe	 that	 conservatives	 are	 “too	 assertive”	 about	 their	 values	 and	 political	
positions).
178	See, e.g.,	 Employment	 Non-Discrimination	 Act,	 American Civil Liberties Union	 (Nov.	 5,	
2009),	 available at http://www.aclu.org/hiv-aids_lgbt-rights/employment-non-discrimination-
act (“When	Congress	has	found	such	discrimination,	it	passed	laws	to	restore	civil	rights	by	ensur-
ing	arbitrary	considerations	do	not	determine	access	to	employment.	We	believe	such	legislation	
continues	to	be	an	essential	part	of	equal	protection	under	the	law.”).	
179	See supra	note	50.
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conservative	Christian	entitlement	no	 longer	goes	unquestioned	and	
unchallenged.	This	victory	signals	to	other	civil	rights	advocates	that,	
although	religion	continues	 to	play	an	 important	role	 in	shaping	the	
cultural	and	political	landscapes	in	which	policymaking	is	one	part,	a	
particular	religious	political	force	does	not	necessarily	have	the	power	
to	single-handedly	dictate	political	outcomes.
ENDA	 was	 anticipated	 to	 pass	 during	 the	 111th	 Congress	 but	 as	
other	 pressing	 political	 issues,	 including	 the	 ban	 on	 open	 military	
service,180	 rise	on	 the	 legislative	priority	 list,	ENDA’s	once	near-clear	
path	to	passage	was	blocked.	Regardless	of	whether	ENDA	is	passed	
this	year	or	in	future	years,	its	narrow	religious	exemption	must	remain	
intact.	Lawmakers	or	LGBT	advocates	must	believe	 in	 their	political	
strength	to	challenge	conservative	Christian	opposition	and	avoid	easy	
concessions	 around	 the	 exemption	 like	 in	 years	 past.	A	 narrow	 reli-
gious	exemption	strikes	the	proper	balance	between	religious	freedom	
and	civil	rights	progress	and	manifests	fair	governmental	treatment	of	
legitimate	rivaling	interests	within	a	diverse	democracy.
V. ConClusion
This	 essay	 traced	 ENDA’s	 long	 religious	 exemption	 history	 to	
explain	how	its	previous	iterations	threatened	to	undermine	the	bill	by	
creating	a	wholesale	exemption	for	religious	organizations.	It	explained	
how	 the	 exemption’s	 broadness	 mirrored	 changing	 attitudes	 about	
LGBT	people	and	speculated	 that	broader	versions	were	most	 likely	
political	compromises	designed	to	placate	 the	conservative	Christian	
bloc.	This	placation,	however,	overreached	to	tip	the	delicate	balance	
between	 religious	 freedom	 and	 religious	 over	 accommodation;	 thus,	
it	most	likely	violated	the	Establishment	Clause.	ENDA’s	current	reli-
gious	exemption	is	integrated	within	a	narrow	Title	VII	version,	signi-
fying	a	major	victory	for	LGBT	advocates.	The	LGBT	movement	and	
other	civil	rights	advocates	have	successfully	challenged	the	conserva-
tive	movement’s	entitlement	to	accommodation	and	averted	religious	
exceptionalism	that	put	future	civil	rights	struggles	at	risk.	Civil	rights	
advocates	must	continue	to	challenge	the	Religious	Right	political	par-
adigm	if	they	truly	wish	to	achieve	justice	and	equality.
180	See Bronwen	Pardes,	House repeals “don’t ask, don’t tell,”	Wash. Examiner,	May	29,	2010	avail-
able at http://www.examiner.com/x-49838-NY-Sexual-Health-Examiner~y2010m5d29-House-
repeals-dont-ask-dont-tell.	
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